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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. DISCUSSION 
The end of the Cold War has had a tremendous impact on 
the structure, size, and capabilities of the United States 
Armed Forces. Both yesterday's threat and the mission of our 
Military Services have changed significantly, leading to the 
current restructuring and downsizing of the Army. The Defense 
buildup period of the early 1980s in which new programs 
flourished, is over. Modifications, pre-planned product 
improvements (P3I), or complete replacement of current weapon 
systems with new systems is extremely costly, and each request 
for funding is reviewed in great detail as Congress looks to 
further reduce Defense spending. 
Consequently, it becomes increasingly important to 
closely scrutinize major weapon acquisition programs to learn 
how most efficiently to use current technology and the 
existing industrial base. Hopefully, this will lead to a 
reduction in program costs while still meeting the needs of 
both the end user and the Army. One highly-successful 
acquisition program worthy of study and review is the United 
States Army's Ml Abrams Tank Program. 
The Ml Abrams Tank Program began in 1972 and is still 
alive today, over twenty years later. Throughout its life, 
this program has evolved from the XM-1 prototype tank, to the 
M1A1, and finally into the M1A2 Block II generation tank. 
Over 8,100 main battle tanks have been produced by the United 
States since the program's inception, and many lessons- 
learned, teaching points, and program models have emerged over 
the past two decades. 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the successful 
acquisition strategy of the Ml Abrams Tank System through a 
comprehensive historical study of its early years of 
procurement, from 1971 to 1982. Emphasis will be on the 
researcher's interpretation of the acquisition strategy, the 
acquisition plan, and the historical events culminating in the 
successful fielding of the world's finest main battle tank. 
From this examination, lessons-learned will be identified that 
can be practically applied to future major weapon systems 
procurements. 
C. RESEARCH SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
This thesis is a case study of the Ml Abrams Tank System 
Acquisition Strategy. The study focuses on three phases of 
the development cycle beginning with the requirements 
determination phase and ending with the tank's introduction 
into the force. Because the acquisition process has 
experienced change and become more structured and formalized 
since the late 1970s and early 1980s, it is both relevant and 
necessary to examine this program in terms of current 
acquisition policy and procedure. Terms and acronyms that 
have changed will be highlighted, discussed, and cross- 
referenced. 
This thesis covers only those aspects relating to the 
program's acquisition strategy and plan. Additionally, 
because this thesis primarily focuses on program management 
and not tank technology, only a general description of the Ml 
Abrams Tank System is covered. Classified aspects of the tank 
system will not be addressed. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1.   The primary research question is: 
What were the principal successes and failures 
experienced with the acquisition strategy of the Ml Abrams 
Tank System and can they be duplicated or avoided in future 
major weapon systems acquisitions? 
2.  Subsidiary research questions include: 
• What is a Mission Need Statement and what is involved 
in its development? 
• What was the Mission Need Statement for the Ml Abrams 
Tank System? 
• What is an Acquisition Strategy and how does it 
relate to the overall acquisition process? 
• What DoD directives and policies govern the 
formulation of an Acquisition Strategy? 
• What was the overall Acquisition Strategy for the Ml? 
• What is an Acquisition Plan?  What are the basic 
requirements involved in its development and 
approval? 
• What was the overall Acquisition Plan (including 
Milestones) for this program and to what extent did 
execution of the program meet the plan? 
E. METHODOLOGY 
Preliminary research included in-depth analysis of the 
program's case history through an extensive literature 
review.  This included historical documentation detailing 
the Mission Need Statement (MNS), the Acquisition Plan, 
Request for Proposals (RFP), the Executive Summary, and DoD 
documents.  A telephonic interview was also conducted with 
the Deputy Program Manager for the M1A2 tank program, LTC 
Cannon, in May 1994. 
F. DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS 
Army and Department of Defense (DoD) definitions and 
acronyms.used in both the Ml Abrams Tank Program and in 
acquisition management are provided throughout the thesis 
where needed.  Appendix A provides, a consolidated list of 
acronyms. 

II.  BACKGROUND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to establish the framework 
behind major weapon systems acquisition. The reader needs to 
have a clear understanding of the policies, politics, and 
purpose behind the acquisition process as a foundation for 
comprehensive analysis of the Ml Abrams Tank Program. Because 
the acquisition process has experienced change and become more 
structured and formalized since the late 1970s and early 
1980s, it. is both relevant and necessary to examine this 
program in terms of current acquisition policy and procedure. 
This chapter provides a thorough overview on the current 
framework behind major weapon systems acquisition. First, 
this chapter highlights the principal players involved in the 
procurement of major weapon systems. Next, a general 
description of the acquisition phase and milestone review 
process is outlined. Finally, the Mission Need Statement 
(MNS), acquisition strategy and acquisition plan are defined 
and discussed in relation to their role in this mechanism. 
B. THE MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS ACQUISITION PROCESS 
1.   Evolution 
The major weapon systems acquisition process emerged from 
a study by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel in 1970 and the 
issuance of DoD Directive 5000.1 in 1971. Further refinement 
came in 1976 when the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
published Circular A-109, Major Systems Acquisition. OMB 
Circular A-109 defines the acquisition process for major 
systems as, 
...the sequence of activities starting from the 
agency's reconciliation of its mission needs, with 
its capabilities, priorities and resources, and 
extending through the introduction of a system into 
operational  use  or  the  otherwise  successful 
achievement cf program objectives.  [Ref. 4:p. 3] 
This circular requires that new programs be started only when 
there is an Executive agency head approval of mission needs, 
i.e., before competitively identifying and exploring system 
design concepts. [Ref. l:p. 4] 
As shown in Figure 1, both DoD Directive 5000.1 and OMB 
Circular A-109 attempt to forge an interface among the three 
decision-making support systems: requirements generation, 
acquisition management, and the Planning, Programming, and 
Budgeting System (PPBS). [Ref. 2:p. 29] It is imperative that 
these three support systems interface effectively for the 
acquisition process to function in a smooth and efficient 
manner. 
Effective Interaction 
Essential for Success 
Figure 1  Three Major Decision-making Support Systems 
[Ref. 2:p. 29] 
The two principal players in the acquisition process are 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology 
(USD(AScT)), and the Program Manager (PM).  They are only two 
of many important participants in this intricate, complex 
process but, together they form the bedrock for successful 
fielding of a new major weapon system. The Secretary of 
Defense (SECDEF) is appointed by the President of the United 
States to manage all military resources. The USD(A&T), 
subject to the authority, direction, and control of the 
SECDEF, serves as the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) for 
the Department of Defense. His authority and principal duties 
include: 
• Serves as the Senior Procurement Executive for DoD. 
• Supervises DoD acquisition. 
• Chairs the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB). 
• Establishes policies for acquisition to include: 
procurement, research and development, logistics, 
developmental testing, and contract management. 
• Establishes policies for the maintenance of the defense 
industrial base of the United States. 
• Prescribes policies to ensure that audit and oversight 
of contractor activities are coordinated and executed 
in a manner to prevent duplication by different 
elements of DoD. 
• Administers .the Defense Acquisition Executive Summary 
and Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria. 
[Ref. 3:p. 1.3.1-1&2] 
All acquisition programs are placed into one of four 
categories. The purpose of these categories is to determine 
the level of milestone decision authority required for each 
program. In essence, this equates to final decision approval 
on whether or not a program will proceed to the next phase. 
Acquisition Category (ACAT) I programs are defined as all 
major programs whose procurement costs are estimated to exceed 
$1.8 billion (FY 1990 constant dollars) or a program whose 
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) costs are 
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estimated to exceed $300 million (FY 1990 constant dollars). 
ACAT I programs are further subdivided into ACAT I D and I C 
where the difference between each is the Milestone Decision 
Authority (MDA). As the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE), 
the USD(A&T) chairs all program and milestone decision reviews 
for ACAT I D major defense acquisition programs. ACAT I C 
programs have the Component Acquisition Executive (CAE) as the 
MDA. ACAT II, III, and IV programs have similar criteria but 
with lower dollar threshold amounts and the MDA is usually the 
CAE or a lower level authority.  [Ref. 3:p. 1.1-1] 
At the core of the major weapon systems acquisition 
process is the Program Manager (PM). The PM is appointed by 
the military system commander to be the prime manager of a 
major system program.  The PM's role is to: 
...exercise technical   and  business/financial 
management for  the  accomplishment  of  program 
objectives within   approved  constraints   and 
thresholds. [Ref. 6:p. 2-1] 
Although the PM receives guidance and direction from a 
higher authority, he alone is responsible and accountable for 
the success or failure of the program. In the broadest sense, 
the PM must manage a program within budget and schedule 
constraints to ensure the acquired weapon system will perform 
as intended and be logistically supportable when fielded to 
the operational user. The PM and his supporting functional 
specialists must continually take into account the roles, 
concerns, and possible actions of players in both the 
Executive and Legislative Branches, DoD, and Military 
Departments, while planning and executing a major weapon 
system acquisition program.  [Ref. 7:p. 2-1] 
First and foremost, the PM's principal function is 
management. This includes: planning, controlling, organizing, 
staffing, leading, budgeting, and monitoring. Successful PMs 
are often characterized as broadly-focused, multi-talented 
individuals who effectively handle the personnel, financial, 
business, and technical management functional areas and, most 
importantly, are excellent communicators.  [Ref. 3:p. 1.2-1] 
All too frequently, the two primary managerial decision- 
makers previously mentioned have different perspectives when 
it comes to developing, producing, and fielding a new weapon 
system.   The PM, while never losing sight of his higher 
authority's ultimate goal, makes every effort to field a 
system that meets the user-defined needs in the MNS.  Often, 
the SECDEF or USD(A&T) are more focused on cost, performance, 
and political consensus.  This can result in an adversarial 
relationship.  Political 'brinkmanship' on the part of the PM 
is both a necessary and useful skill which must be mastered, 
to one degree or another, in order to survive in the Capitol 
Hill arena.  [Ref. 3:p. 1.2-1] 
2.   Phases and Milestone Reviews 
Providing operational military forces the weapon system 
resources needed to accomplish DoD objectives is the lifeblood 
of the major weapon systems acquisition process. The SECDEF, 
assisted by the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), guides and 
controls the major system acquisition process by a sequence of 
program activity phases, milestone reviews, and decision 
points. This process is structured in five discrete phases 
separated by the major milestones shown in Figure 2. The 
primary purpose behind this functional design is to provide 
both a management and decision-making forum with a foundation 
and structure conducive to the long-term, multi-faceted 
acquisition process.  [Ref. 4:p. 2-1] 
All acquisition . programs commence with a need that 
results from a deficiency in current or projected 
capabilities, from a technological opportunity to establish 
new or improved capabilities, or in response to a change in 
national defense policy. [Ref. 7:p. 4-1] Although not a 
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Figure 2  Acquisition Milestones and Phases 
[Ref. 4:p. 2-1] 
the requirements generation process with a Mission Area 
Analysis (MAA). 
This analysis uncovers "warfighting deficiencies"; 
i.e., limitations or inabilities of the Services to 
perform one or more of their various broad 
missions; technological opportunities to perform 
their missions better; or potential cost 
reductions.  [Ref. 3:p. 1.1-2] 
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The requirements generation cycle begins with an 
operational requirement stated in very broad, nonspecific 
terms. Once an operational requirement is identified, studies 
of potential non-material or material alternatives are 
conducted which can rectify and correct this deficiency in our 
existing capability. The Mission Need Statement (MNS) is 
generated from this inadequacy in an existing capability and, 
for the Army, is produced by combat developers in the DoD 
Component branch school such as the armor, infantry, or field 
artillery schools. 
DoD Directive 5000.2 establishes the general policies and 
procedures for managing major and non-major defense 
acquisition programs. As shown in Figure 2, milestone 
decisions proceed every phase and result in the decision 
authority's approval to either advance into the next phase or 
not to proceed. Exit criteria are established at the 
beginning of each phase and must successfully be accomplished 
by the milestone review before the next program phase can 
commence. An arduous, time-consuming process, each phase can 
last anywhere from six months to several years, depending on 
the complexity of the system being purchased. 
Milestone 0, Concept Studies Approval, represents the 
first integration between the requirements generation and 
acquisition management systems. At this milestone decision 
point, the MDA determines if the draft MNS warrants a study of 
alternative concepts that can possibly satisfy the identified 
mission need. Nonmaterial solutions such as a change in 
tactics, training, organizational structure, or doctrine, are 
analyzed to determine if they can rectify this operational 
deficiency. If nonmaterial solutions are ruled out, a 
material need is documented in the MNS. A successful 
Milestone 0 review will result in entry into Phase 0, the 
Concept Exploration and Definition phase (CE/D). [Ref. 3:p. 
1.1-2] 
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Phase 0, CE/D, is d-signed to identify and investigate 
alternative system design concepts that will satisfy the 
mission need.  Studies by the Government and/or industry are 
conducted and system concepts  are defined and selected for 
further development. A Cost and Operational Effectiveness 
Analysis (COEA) is conducted for each alternative concept and 
is used to judge the viability and risk areas associated with 
each alternative.  Schedule, performance, and design  trade- 
off  opportunities  are  explored  and  the most  promising 
alternatives are chosen. At the conclusion of this phase, the 
study director recommends one or more of the alternative 
design concepts be carried forward.  An initial acquisition 
strategy covering development through fielding is formulated, 
as well as an initial Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) 
consisting of key cost, schedule, and performance parameters. 
Several documents are required for the Milestone I, 
Concept Studies Approval, review.  One of the most important 
documents is the Operational Requirements Document (ORD). The 
ORD, formerly called the Required Operational Capability (ROC) 
document,  details the performance and related operational 
parameters for the proposed system and it also establishes the 
minimum acceptable requirements.   Prepared by the user,  the 
ORD  spells  out  what  the  required  system capabilities, 
characteristics,  and performance parameters will be,  to 
include  items  such as  range,  accuracy,  speed,  payload, 
communication   requirements,   maintenance  and   logistic 
requirements, and personnel requirements.  [Ref. 12:pp. 3-1 
thru 3-3]  This document is updated and revised as needed for 
each milestone review. 
A successful Milestone I review constitutes program 
initiation and marks the formal designation of a PM. Here is 
where the acquisition management system first interfaces with 
the PPBS through a major program 'new start' issue paper. 
This issue paper is sent to the Deputy SECDEF "...to confirm 
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that resources are available to support the program in the 
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)". [Ref. 3:p. 1.1-3] 
Successful concept studies and a confirmation of available 
resources (funding) are the two primary prerequisites for 
entry into the next phase. Milestone I, Concept Demonstration 
Approval, success signifies a validation of the requirement 
and authorization to proceed into Phase I, Demonstration and 
Validation (DEM/VAL). 
The purpose of the DEM/VAL phase is to further develop, 
demonstrate, and validate the most promising alternative 
concepts. Critical design characteristics and expected 
capabilities of the system concept are clearly defined. 
Technical risk and design cost drivers are identified and 
design trade-offs are conducted in an ever present effort to 
mitigate program risks. [Ref. 3:p. 1.1-3] Competition and 
risk reduction are often enhanced by the introduction of 
competitive prototyping between two or more contractors during 
this phase. Comparative and developmental testing of the 
system and/or critical subsystems are conducted to verify 
performance and potential suitability of the concept to fill 
the mission need. Low rate initial production (LRIP) 
quantities, if part of the acquisition strategy, are 
definitized during this phase as part of the exit criteria. A 
favorable Milestone II, Development Approval, review will 
approve entry into Phase II, Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development (EMD). 
EMD is a complex, difficult, and highly-visible phase of 
the program in which considerable resources and manpower are 
expended. [Ref. 3:p. 1.1-4] The purpose of this phase is 
to: 
• Translate the most promising design approach developed 
in Phase I into a stable, producible, and cost 
effective system design. 
• Validate the manufacturing or production process. 
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• Demonstrate   through   testing   that   the   system 
capabilities meet contract specification requirements, 
satisfy the mission need, and meet minimum acceptable 
operation performance requirements.  [Ref. 5:p.3-21] 
The predominant emphasis in EMD is on design, test, and 
production readiness activities. LRIP quantities are 
produced, providing a means to validate the production 
process while, simultaneously, supplying the required number 
of production-representative articles for Initial Operational 
Test and Evaluation (IOT&E). Successful Milestone III, 
Production Approval, allows entry into the next phase, 
Production and Deployment. 
Phase III, Production and Deployment, is one of the most 
difficult challenges the PM will face next to software 
design/management. The objective of this phase is to achieve 
a stable, efficient production base and initiate deployment of 
the system to the operational user in the field. Production 
acceptance and verification testing on production line items 
and Follow-on Operational Test and Evaluation (FOT&E) 
performance are monitored with great scrutiny. [Ref. 3:p. 
1.1-5] Logistics supportability and production issues will 
prevail. Continuous monitoring of the contractor on 
production performance, quality, and deficiency correction, is 
essential. Once the system is in the hands of the user, 
operational and/or support problems are identified and 
corrected. The overall goal of the Production and Deployment 
Phase is to successfully achieve an initial operational 
capability (IOC) and later, the full operational capability 
(FOC). 
Milestone IV, Major Modification Approval, is required 
only if a major change to the system is necessary while it is 
still in production. If a system is out of production, a 
major system change is categorized as an upgrade and it would 
compete with other concepts in Phase 0, CE/D.  [Ref. 3:p. 1.1- 
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5] If a major modification is approved, the MDA will 
determine which phase the program will be placed into based on 
the level of program risk, cost, testing, and other relevant 
factors.  Usually the program is placed into Phase II, EMD. 
Phase IV, Operations and Support, is the final phase in 
the acquisition process and, in essence, is an extension of 
the Production and Deployment Phase. As soon as a new system 
is fielded to the operational user, operational readiness 
must be sustained. Spare parts, modifications, maintenance, 
and support for new technologies are maintained to ensure the 
equipment's service life is extended as long as possible. The 
acquisition process terminates when the system is fully 
retired from the service. 
It is important to note that not all systems follow the 
same exact sequence of activities. One of the key policies 
contained in OMB Circular A-109, is the requirement to tailor 
each acquisition program and continuously refine the 
acquisition strategy as the program advances.  [Ref. 4:p. 5] 
C.   THE MISSION NEED STATEMENT (MNS): ITS IMPORTANCE AND 
RELATIONSHIP TO THE ACQUISITION PROCESS 
Determination of mission need, although not a formal 
phase of the acquisition process, is perhaps the most 
important element for all potential material acquisition 
programs. This informal phase addresses the Service's 
perceived needs through an examination of nonmaterial and 
material solutions. As discussed earlier, when a deficiency 
in an existing capability cannot be overcome through a 
nonmaterial solution, a material solution is developed and 
documented in a MNS. DoD Directive 5000.1 requires the MNS to 
define projected needs in broad operational terms. [Ref. 8:p. 
2-3] The MNS should not be written in terms of equipment or 
system-specific performance characteristics. It is written as 
a deficiency not as a requirement.   However, it is very 
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important that the M::S identify the validated threat to be 
countered as well as the projected threat environment in which 
the system must operate.  [Ref. 12:p. 2-1-1] 
A considerable amount of forethought and planning must go 
into the development of this document. A poorly written MNS 
is open to many misinterpretations that can result in the user 
not obtaining the weapon system he desperately requires. 
Without an approved MNS, a major Defense acquisition program 
will never leave the drawing board. 
It is important to understand how the MNS is processed 
for major Defense acquisition programs (ACAT I) .  First, the 
MNS goes through the Service chain for approval by the Service 
Chief.   It is then forwarded to the Joint Requirements 
Oversight Council (JROC) for validation and approval.  The 
primary function of the JROC is to review the validity of an 
identified mission need, assess its joint Service potential, 
and prioritize the importance and urgency in which this need 
is to be addressed. The JROC forwards their recommendation to 
the DAB Committee for review prior to the actual Board 
convening for a Milestone 0 review. Once approved by the DAB, 
the USD(A&T) issues an Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) 
authorizing entry into Phase 0 CE/D.  [Ref. 3:p. 1.1-2] 
D.   ACQUISITION STRATEGY 
From the 1950s through the early 1970s the term 
"acquisition strategy" was used to loosely describe the 
overall planning for a program. Numerous studies have been 
conducted over the past 2 0 years in an attempt to define and 
describe acquisition strategy development and implementation. 
One particular study was conducted in 1976 using the combined 
techniques of interview and questionnaire. [Ref. 9:p. 9] 
Subjects ranged from PMs to staff officers in program offices 
to members of the civilian acquisition workforce. When asked 
to define  "acquisition  strategy",  almost  all  interview 
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subjects claimed to understand the concept, but none could 
formulate a complete or comprehensive definition.  One PM 
stated, "I don't get involved in that at all."  [Ref. 9:p. 9] 
That, however, is the PM's job! 
The Federal Acquisition Regulation  (FAR)  defines an 
acquisition strategy as: 
...the program manager's overall plan for 
satisfying the mission need in the most effective, 
economical, and timely manner.  [Ref. 10:p. 18,208] 
An acquisition strategy can be thought of as the primary road 
map or blueprint on how the PM expects the program to evolve 
from the basic mission need to system production and equipment 
fielding. It is a 'living' document which is updated and 
revised from its inception during Phase 0 throughout the 
entire acquisition process. 
Initially broad in scope, the acquisition strategy 
becomes increasingly more refined as the system nears 
production and deployment. It covers the entire life of the 
proposed system and is one of the tools utilized to reduce and 
mitigate risks in the program. This strategy lays the 
foundation for management concepts, control measures, 
contracting alternatives, competition, test and evaluation 
requirements, logistics support, personnel and training 
requirements, funding issues, and a host of other important 
factors in the acquisition program. [Ref. 3:p. 1.2-2] 
Because of its importance, the strategy will be tailored to 
meet the specific needs of the program as directed by DoD 
Directive 5000.2 [Ref. 5:p. 5-A-l] The acquisition strategy 
is a means by which the PM can evaluate and integrate the 
multitude of decisions he must make early on in the program 
life-cycle, leaving as many options as possible open for 
future consideration. 
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E.   ACQUISITION PLAN 
Over the past 20 years it has become increasingly more 
obvious that sound acquisition planning is critical to a 
program's success.  Acquisition planning is, 
...the process by which the efforts of all 
personnel responsible for an acquisition are 
coordinated and integrated through a comprehensive 
plan for fulfilling the agency need in a timely 
manner and at a reasonable cost. [Ref. 10 :p. 
16,305] 
Prior to the enactment of the Competition in Contracting Act 
(CICA) in 1984, acquisition planning was often fragmented, 
haphazard, and informal. Both the acquisition plan and the 
planning process are now much more formalized and have 
statutory and regulatory requirements outlined in the FAR, 
Part 7. This plan documents the decisions made during the 
development of the acquisition strategy to include: the 
program's major objectives, policies, and all the definitive 
actions that must be accomplished during the various phases of 
the acquisition cycle. It integrates all of the technical, 
business, management, legal, and other significant actions 
which must be accomplished throughout the life-cycle of the 
program.  [Ref. 10:p. 16,306] 
Like the strategy, the acquisition plan is also a 
'living' document and it is updated periodically; at a 
mininum, on an annual basis. The plan is specific with 
respect to near-term goals and it maps the objectives and 
actions required on long-term goals. The acquisition plan 
contains the who, what, where, when, why, and how the program 
will proceed from start to finish. It is an all-encompassing 
document that decribes the coordinated efforts of all 
procurement agencies participating in the program and it 
clearly addresses the essential elements of the procurement. 
The elements of the acquisition plan are mandated in the 
FAR, Part 7. There are two major headings: the Background and 
Objectives, and the Plan of Action.   The Background and 
Objectives section contains the following subsections: 
1. Statement of Need 
2 . Applicable Conditions 
3. Cost 
a.   Acquisition Cost 
b.   Life Cycle Cost 
c.   Design-to-Cost 
d.   Should-Cost Analysis 
4. Capability or Performance 




8. Acquisition Streamlining 
[Ref. ll:p. xi] 
The Plan of Action section contains the following subsections: 
1. Sources 
a.   Mandatory Sources 
b.   Small and Disadvantaged Businesses 
2. Competition 
a.   Competitive Procedures 
b.   Other than Competitive Procedures 
c.   Limitations on the Use of Other 
than Competitive Procedures 
d.   Justifications and Approvals 
3. Source Selection Procedures 
4. Contracting Considerations 
a.   Type of Contract 
b.   Special Procurement Techniques 
c.   Sealed Bidding 
5. Budgeting and Funding 
6. Product Descriptions 
a.   Restrictive Specifications 
b.   Unclear or Ambiguous Specifications 
7. Priorities and Allocations 
8. Contractor vs. Government Performance 
9. Management Information Requirements 
10 Make-or-Buy 
11 Test and Evaluation 
12 Logistics Considerations 
a.   Warranties 
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b.   Contracting for Parts or Components 
13. Government-furnished Property 
14. Government-furnished Information 
15. Environmental Considerations 
16. Security Considerations 
17. Other Considerations 
18. Milestones for the Acquisition 
19. Participants 
[Ref. ll:pp. xi-xiii] 
Individual program acquisition plans are tailored and, 
understandably, will vary in content from the above format. 
It is obvious, from the elements listed above, why the 
acquisition plan is all-encompassing and of such strategic 
importance to the success or failure of a major acquisition 
program. 
F.   SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided a broad overview of the 
intricate and complex process of acquiring major weapon 
systems. The major weapon systems acquisition process is 
structured in five discrete phases seperated by five milestone 
decision points. The MNS, acquisition strategy, and 
acquisition plan are three critical documents required upfront 
and early in the acquisition process. These three documents 
lay the foundation and framework for the future success of any 
program and require careful, thorough planning in their 
development. All programs should be tailored to fit their own 
specific objectives and individual characteristics. The 
tailoring of a specific program is accomplished through both 
the acquisition strategy and the acquisition plan. 
20 
III.  THE Ml ABRAMS TANK PROGRAM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a thorough overview of the 
acquisition history for the Ml Abrams Tank Program. A 
description of the tank is also provided to include its 
capabilities, characteristics, and significant features. In 
addition, program management issues are discussed in order to 
lay a foundation for the acquisition strategy discussion in 
the  subsequent  chapter. 
B. ACQUISITION HISTORY OF THE Ml ABRAMS TANK 
1.   The MBT-70/XM-803 Joint Venture 
Although one of the Army's main battle tanks (MBT), the 
M-60, was first fielded to operational units in 1959, it was 
not a true, newly-designed tank but rather a tank "...hastily 
cobbled together from parts of two earlier tanks." [Ref. 12:p. 
21] When retired General James H. Polk, commander of the U.S. 
Army in Europe during the late 1960's, was asked to assess 
this 'new' M-60 tank he said, "...the reworked tank will not 
be the best tank on the European battlefield by any stretch of 
the imagination." [Ref. 13:p. 9] This fact, coupled with the 
knowledge that Warsaw Pact tanks outnumbered those of NATO by 
a two-to-one margin, made it clear that the United States Army 
needed a new main battle tank to assure victory on the next 
battlefield.  [Ref. 12:p. 14] 
In 1963, only four years after the fielding of the M-60 
tank had begun, both the United States and the Federal 
Republic of Germany (GE) entered into a formal agreement for 
joint development of a main battle tank, the MBT-7 0 (later re- 
designated the XM-803) .. [Ref. 14 :p. 1] SECDEF Robert S. 
McNamara, was the major proponent for this joint venture 
because he was convinced: 
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...that by sharing ideas and costs, the allies 
could produce weapons that not only were better and 
cheaper but would be easier and less expensive to 
maintain than if each nation continued to go its 
own way.  [Ref. 12:p. 25] 
Unfortunately, both McNamara and the Army had differing 
agendas; the former was politically-motivated and the latter 
tactically-motivated. McNamara wanted to develop a new 
process for providing weapons for the alliance; the Army just 
wanted a new tank capable of defeating the enemy. [Ref. 12: 
pp. 2 5-26] 
The foreign joint venture had very strong support but, 
nonetheless failed after eight years, ending in December 1971. 
The primary reason for the MBT-70 program failure was its high 
per unit cost estimate of between $850,000 to $1,000,000 (FY 
1969 dollars). [Ref. 14:p. 1] By comparison, the per unit 
cost of the M-60 tank was much lower, between $218,000 and 
$333,000. The Conference Committee of the U.S. Senate and 
House of Representatives was " . . .firmly convinced that no tank 
is worth that much money." [Ref. 15:p. 2] . After spending 
over $215 million on Research & Development (R&D) , and eight 
years of intense effort, the program was terminated as 
unnecessarily complex, excessively sophisticated, and too 
expensive.  [Ref. 15 :p. 2] 
2.   Genesis of the Ml Tank System 
a. The Task Force  at Work 
In January 1972, the United States Army established 
a task force headed by Major General (MG) William R. Desobry 
to develop a main battle tank which would improve performance 
and capabilities beyond those of the M-60 tank. [Ref. 12:p. 
93] With a budget of $217,500 and a five month time 
constraint, the mission of this task force was to produce a 
draft Mission Need Statement (MNS), prepare and outline a 
development schedule, and prepare as complete a concept 
formulation package as possible.  [Ref. 14:pp. 1&2] 
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The job of the task force was not to design a tank but to 
prepare the Army to tell the competing contractors what the 
tank would be expected to do. [Ref. 12:p. 94] Three critical 
questions had to be answered about the tank. 
How much should it weigh? 
•  How large a crew is needed to man it? 
What weapons should it carry? 
[Ref. 12:p. 94] 
The task force debated and deliberated several weeks over 
these questions and conducted in-house trade-off analysis on 
each critical issue. 
The task force received two very specific messages from 
both Congress and the Pentagon. Their goal was not to build 
the best tank in the world, but to build the best tank 
possible for a limited amount of money: about $500,000 per 
tank (FY 1972 constant dollars). [Ref. 12:p. 95] The most 
overriding and time-consuming issue for the task force became 
the question of weight. 
A breakthrough in armor technology, called Chobham armor, 
was developed by the British and further "Americanized" by 
scientists in the United States during the spring of 1972. 
This 'new' armor, arranged in honeycomb-like baffles, 
contained an alloy of depleted uranium making it much stronger 
than conventional armor. This depleted uranium alloy had two 
and one-half times the density of steel without the added 
thickness. [Ref. 12 :p. 130] Unknown at the time, this new 
armor would dominate design, weight, and cost of the tank for 
several years and it required a new and as yet unperfected 
method of manufacture. Additional weight had a major impact 
on several of the tank sub-systems including the engine, 
transmission, suspension, and track; all of which would have 
to be made more powerful and/or durable due to the added 
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stres.. .d burden of increased weight. [Ref. 12:pp. 95-130] 
A. aough the issue of weight would fluctuate for several 
years, the task force initially recommended a weight between 
46 and 52 tons. A recommendation of four personnel to crew 
the vehicle was also forwarded, along with weapons consisting 
of a 105 millimeter (mm) main gun, a 7.62mm co-axial machine 
gun, a 7.62mm loaders machine gun and a .50 caliber machine 
gun for the tank commander. [Ref. 12:pp. 95-106] In August 
1972, the task force published their concept for the new main 
battle tank. On 18 January 1973, the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense signed the Development Concept Paper (presently known 
as the Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM)) which defined 
the final approved program.  [Ref. 17:p. 8] 
The principal objective of the Ml Tank Program provided 
in the MNS was to field a tank system: 
...specifically designed as an assault vehicle to 
replace an aging fleet and to meet the projected 
threat of the 1980's and beyond.  [Ref. 16 :p. 2] 
In addition, this tank system would provide increased 
performance over other tanks currently in the Army inventory 
in the areas of reliability, availability, maintainability, 
survivability, tactical mobility, night fighting capability, 
fire-on-the-move capability, and hit probability. [Ref. 16:p. 
2] 
The MNS also highlighted the Army's evaluation of the 
shortcomings of the current M-60 tank. The M-60 tank was 
deemed tactically and technically incapable of defeating a 
numerically superior threat under day, night, adverse weather, 
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC), and normal 
battlefield obscurant conditions. The following M-60 tank 
operational deficiencies existed: 
Large silhouette in both height and 
width; larger than any other tank in the 
world. 
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Inadequate acceleration and cross-country 
speed. 
Unacceptable reliability of mobility and 
firepower systems. 
Lack of adequate firepower on the move. 
Insufficient ballistic protection against 
hyper-velocity kinetic energy munitions. 
[Ref. 14:p. 4] 
The user wanted a tank that would be faster, more 
survivable, and more lethal than the M-60 tank. Early in the 
program it was hypothesized that the new Ml tank, in the long 
run, would be cheaper to operate and support in the field than 
the M-60 tank. Although this hypothesis was later proven to 
be inaccurate, the performance advantages of the Ml tank far 
surpassed those of the M-60 tank.  [Ref. 18:p. 1] 
b. Phase I: Competitive Prototype Validation 
The procurement philosophy for the tank was a seven- 
year development program accomplished in three separate, 
distinct phases. Phase I of the plan was Competitive 
Prototype Validation, currently known as Demonstration and 
Validation (DEM/VAL). This phase combined both the Concept 
Exploration and Definition phase and the Demonstration and 
Validation phase of today into one succinct phase of 
operation. In this phase, competitive prototypes were 
developed and produced by two contractors, the Defense 
Division of Chrysler Corporation and the Detroit Allison 
Division of General Motors Corporation (GM) . [Ref. 16:pp. 
2,7]  Contracts to both competitors were awarded on 2 8 June 
1973 with prototype vehicle delivery scheduled for February 
1976. 
While Phase I prototype vehicles were being produced by 
both competitors, the Army signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) with the Federal Republic of Germany in 
1974 to evaluate a modified version of the West German Leopard 
II Tank against U.S. material need requirements. The goal was 
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to achieve maximum standardization of tank subsystems of both 
the U.S. and West German tanks by the date of introduction 
into their respective forces. FMC Corporation expressed an 
interest in representing Krauss-Maffei, the German tank 
producer, for U.S. production of the Leopard II Tank. After 
completing an extensive cost/feasibility study, FMC 
Corporation and the Germans agreed that the venture presented 
an extreme degree of high cost and risk and they withdrew from 
the competition.  [Ref. 19:p. 6] 
After extensive comparative engineering and operational 
testing on both prototype vehicles, the Source Selection 
Authority (SSA), Secretary of the Army Donald Rumsfeld, 
selected the Defense Division of Chrysler Corporation 
prototype vehicle for entry into Phase II. [Ref. 12:pp. 142- 
156] . But, the selection of Chrysler Corporation was not a 
clear-cut, easy decision to make. Both GM and Chrysler were 
given liberal freedom to produce a prototype tank through 
using Government performance specifications versus the more 
restrictive design specifications. [Ref. 12:p. 138] The 
following six mandatory requirements were placed on both 
contractors for Phase I: 
Tank weight not to exceed 58 tons. 
Width not to exceed 144 inches (permitting passage 
through tunnels in Europe). 
Remain on schedule. 
Provide significant improvements over the current 
M-60 tank. 
Meet Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, 
and Durability (RAMD) standards. 
Remain under the Design-to-Unit-Cost (DTUC) ceiling 
of $507,790 per tank in FY 1972 dollars. 
[Ref. 12:p. 140] 
As  long  as  the  contractors  met  these  six  mandatory 
requirements, they had the freedom to make trade-offs between 
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other  factors  such  as  survivability,  mobility,  and 
transportability.  [Ref. 12:p. 140] 
Because use of the new armor technology imposed 
additional weight requirements, the necessity for an engine at 
least twice as powerful as ones currently existing, posed a 
critical problem for both contractors. Chrysler Corporation 
developed a modified helicopter turbine engine; a moderately 
risky, new technological invention. GM, on the other hand, 
developed a new variable compression diesel engine much like 
that which powered the M-60 tank. The advantages of the 
turbine engine over a diesel engine are: 
Smaller/lighter than diesel engine 
Quieter engine with a near-smokeless exhaust 
Requires no warm-up period before starting in 
adverse weather 
Quicker acceleration from idle to full power 
More reliable and easier/cheaper to maintain 
Comprised of one-third less internal moving parts 
The disadvantages of the turbine engine are: 
Requires  'clean'  air;  a  tough  requirement  to 
fulfill on a dirty battlefield 
Requires more fuel to operate which is a logistics 
and cost burden 
• Requires ' new inventory of spare parts, new 
maintenance procedures, and new training for 
personnel 
Costs roughly $40,000 more to manufacture per 
engine 
• Moderately risky 'new' technology 
[Ref. 12:pp. 140-145] 
Both contractors produced excellent prototype vehicles; 
each with its own strengths and advantages. In the end, the 
turbine-powered Chrysler tank won primarily because their 
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contract proposal bic for full-scale development was $196 
million; $36 million less than GM.  [Ref. 12:p. 158] 
c.     Phase  II:   Engineering Development  and 
Producibility Engineering and Planning 
Phase II of the plan was Full Scale Engineering 
Development  and  Producibility  Engineering  and  Planning 
(ED/PEP),  known  today  as  Engineering  and  Manufacturing 
Development (EMD).  During this phase, Chrysler fabricated 11 
XM1 pilot vehicles at the Detroit Arsenal Tank Plant (DATP), 
from November 1976 through March 1978.  These pre-production 
pilot vehicles underwent extensive concurrent developmental 
and operational  testing (DT/OT II) from March 1978 through 
February 1979.  [Ref. 12:pp. 161-162] 
Simultaneous with this activity, a second production 
site, the Lima Army Tank Plant (LATP) located in Lima, Ohio, 
was built, fully-facilitized, and labeled as the most modern 
and efficient tank production facility in the world. The 
Acquisition Plan called for the use of interdependent 
Government-Owned/Contractor-Operated (GOCO) facilities to 
produce the Ml tank. Both DATP and LATP were adopted as GOCO 
facilities. Unlike most conventional GOCO arrangements, 
Chrysler Defense had their own unique production process which 
.they used to manufacture the Ml Tank System while the 
Government provided its requirements in the Technical Data 
Package (TDP).  [Ref. 19:p. 7] 
DT/OT II did not proceed without its fair share of 
problems. The first major problem occurred with Chrysler's 
engine subcontractor, Avco Lycoming. A GOCO facility in 
Stratford, Connecticut became Avco Lycoming's base plant in 
1976. Seeing little use since World War II production of the 
Navy's Corsair fighters, this hanger-like plant was in 
deplorable condition. Lacking efficient management personnel, 
suitable work conditions, and modernized plant equipment, Avco 
Lycoming's engine production fell drastically behind schedule. 
28 
[Ref. 12:p. 160]    Production and quality control problems 
also plagued this sole-source contractor, to the point that: 
...under increasing pressure from the Army, Avco 
finally brought in new management, modernized the 
plant and equipment, and, belatedly, got a handle 
on production and quality control problems. [Ref. 
12:p. 161] 
During concurrent DT/OT II in 1978 and 1979, a limited 
number of prototype vehicles available for testing became a 
major problem. With no room for slippage in the already tight 
schedule, no shakedown-period was provided for vehicles coming 
directly from the factory prior to the commencement of 
testing. Without adequate time to identify and fix 
deficiencies in the pilot vehicles before testing began, 
numerous unforeseen problems developed during testing. To 
make matters worse, the shortage of prototype vehicles was so 
severe that none were on-hand back in the plant on which to 
replicate and solve the problems identified at the test sites. 
[Ref. 12:pp. 161&162] 
Two other major problems surfaced during OT II. Chrysler 
did not provide well-written technical manuals for operator- 
level maintenance functions and their maintenance test 
equipment was poorly designed. Because the tank was brand-new 
and significantly different from the M-60 tank the soldiers 
were familiar with, the poorly-written technical manuals for 
normal operation and maintenance functions were virtually 
unusable by the soldiers. In addition, the test equipment 
used to identify, diagnose, and fix tank malfunctions did not 
isolate and detect problems properly and it was not user- 
friendly.  [Ref. 12:p. 163] 
These problems, coupled with a myriad of normal design 
glitches, caused great concern for all involved in the 
program. Engine and transmission failures were relatively 
high as was the occurrence of thrown tank track.  Eventually 
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these problems were solved and "...those closest to the 
situation were convinced they did not have any 'program 
.toppers'."  [Ref. 12:p. 167] 
At the conclusion of DT/OT II, test score results were 
well above the threshold necessary for a production go-ahead. 
In April 1979, the Army Systems Acquisition Review Council 
(ASARC) and the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council 
(DSARC), currently known as the DAB, recommended the XM1 for 
Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP). Initially, a total 
quantity of 3,312 tanks was required, but in 1981 that figure 
was revised upward to a total production requirement of 7,058 
tanks through FY 1988.  [Ref. 14:p. B-10] 
d. Phase III: Low-Rate Initial Production 
LRIP at the Lima and Detroit Arsenal Tank Plants 
called for assembly of 110 vehicles. The first two production 
tanks were delivered at LATP for a special acceptance ceremony 
on 28 February 1980. At this ceremony, the new tank was 
unveiled and formally named in honor of the late General 
Creighton Abrams, Jr.  [Ref. 14:p. B-9] 
The LRIP vehicles underwent DT/OT III from September 1980 
to May 1981. In January 1981, the XMl achieved Initial 
Operational Capability (IOC). The tank was type-classified 
Standard as the Ml Abrams Tank on 17 February 1981, and full 
production of 60 vehicles per month (30 at LATP and 3 0 at 
DATP) was authorized on 19 November 1981. General Dynamics 
Land Systems (GDLS) purchased Chrysler Defense in February 
1982 and assumed all contractual responsibilities with the 
Government for production of the tank. [Ref. 14:pp. B-6 thru 
B-ll] 
In January 1981, the Ml Abrams Tank was first fielded to 
units in the United States, and one year later, to units in 
Europe. This newly-designed tank met or exceeded all design 
and performance specifications and its capability improvements 
excited both the program personnel and the operational user. 
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[Ref. 14:p. C-5] 
C.   DESCRIPTION OF THE Ml ABRAMS TANK 
As shown in Figure 3, the Ml Abrams Tank is a 60-ton, 
fully-integrated, four man crew, advanced technology, armored 
tank system. Powered by a 1,500 horsepower multi-fuel, air 
cooled turbine engine, this tank can reach a top speed of 45 
miles per hour (mph) . The turbine engine produces a 25:1 
horsepower-to-ton ratio and, coupled with its automatic, six- 
speed transmission, can accelerate from 0 to 20 mph in 6.1 
seconds. With its 500 gallon compartmentalized fuel tank, the 
tank has a cruising range of just over 275 miles. The Abrams 
tank also has a compartmentalized ammunition storage area and 
self-activating Halon fire extinguishers to enhance crew 
survivability.  [Ref. 20:pp. 31-34] 
Fire control for the Ml consists of a ballistic computer, 
laser range finder,  gunner and commander sights,  and a 
parallel-scan thermal image system.  The fire control system 
is  designed  to provide  a  stabilized,  fully-integrated, 
day/night sighting system capable of accurate shoot-on-the- 
move operation.  An auxiliary 'telescope' is provided as a 
main  gun  secondary  fire  control  device.  ' An  advanced 
suspension system comprised of 14 road wheel stations with 
steel torsion bars and intermittent rotary shock absorbers, 
provides the capability to deliver accurate fire-on-the-move, 
as well as increased speed and agility over rough terrain. 
[Ref. 20:pp. 31-34] 
Primary armament for the system is provided by the 105mm 
M68 main gun. However, the turret has been designed to 
accept, at a later date, an upgraded 12 0mm main gun with only 
minor structural changes. (M1A1 Abrams Tank scheduled for 
production in late 1985) Complimentary armament consists of 
a .50 caliber machine gun for the tank commander and two 
7.62mm machine guns, one coaxially mounted along the main gun 
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Figure 3  The Ml Abrams Tank 
Source: Powerpoint Clip Art 
and the other externally-mounted at the loader's station. 
Smoke screen generation is accomplished by the use of two 
externally-mounted six-tube grenade launchers and an engine- 
mounted smoke generation device. [Ref. 20:pp. 31-34] 
Appendix B provides an unclassified, consolidated list of the 
Ml Abrams Tank system characteristics. 
D.   PROGRAM MANAGEMENT OF THE Ml ABRAMS TANK 
1.   Appointment of the First PM 
On 18 July 1972, Brigadier General (BG) Robert J. Baer 
was named program manager for the Ml Abrams tank. The program 
was of such vital importance to the Army that: 
...he received a seven-page charter giving him a 
direct channel of communication to both the Chief 
of Staff and Secretary of the Army. [Ref. 12 :p. 
132] 
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Unlike his predecessor on the MBT-70 program, BG Baer 
established his headquarters in Warren, Michigan, near the 
Detroit Army Tank Plant in order to keep a close eye on both 
contractors and maintain a handle on their day-to-day 
activities. Although funding issues were of critical 
importance to the program, he organized a strong supporting 
staff in Washington, D.C., to interact with both the Pentagon 
and program allies on Capitol Hill. He compensated for the 
distance gap from the capitol by making frequent trips and 
maintaining important face-to-face communication with his 
superiors. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Abrams, 
charged both BG Baer and the Commandant of the Armor Center, 
Major General (MG) Donn Starry, with total responsibility for 
the success of the program. BG Baer was responsible as the 
'builder' and MG Starry as the representative/coordinator of 
the user community.  [Ref. 12:pp. 132-133] 
A great working relationship existed between both men. 
BG Baer was directed not to let the user community add costly, 
unnecessary "...bells and whistles. . . " and to keep the design 
simple; "....we can't afford the best of everything." [Ref. 
12 :p. 133] Simultaneously, MG Starry was directed to keep 
United States Army Europe (USAREUR): "...informed of what 
we're doing to make sure their input is reflected in the 
tank." [Ref. 12:p. 134] This close personal and working 
relationship was one key to the early success of the program 
as they both swore they were not going to let anyone drive a 
wedge between them.  [Ref. 12:pp. 134-135] 
a.   The PM's Challenge 
The first two immediate problems that BG Baer faced 
as the PM were to establish both cost goals and the criteria 
for selection of prototype contractors. A cost committee was 
immediately formed and their first task was to determine how 
to break down and establish cost. This was no simple task, 
considering that the committee had no idea what the tank would 
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look like, who would build it, and how many would be built. 
Complicating matters further, the tank would not begin 
production for at least five more years.  [Ref. 12:p. 135] 
Two methods of measuring cost were defined; design-to- 
unit-hardware-cost (DTUC) and life-cycle-cost (LCC) . The DTUC 
figure is calculated by estimating the cost of individual 
components of a weapon system and adding them all together for 
a total, individual system cost. This method of cost 
breakdown includes the cost of building an individual tank and 
includes the cost of special tools and equipment used in the 
manufacturing process. Unfortunately, it does not include the 
funds expended on research and development (R&D) nor the 
inherent costs for production facilities. In simplistic 
terms, this cost is loosely comparable to what most people 
think of as the 'sticker price'.  [Ref. 12:p. 136] 
The LCC, on the other hand, not only covers the R&D, 
manufacturing, and production costs, but also the total 
operating costs of a system as long as it remains in service. 
This includes the personnel, training, maintenance, spare 
parts, fuel, and other logistical support costs, and even 
disposal costs associated with the system at the time of 
retirement. In essence, the LCC is the only cost figure which 
tells the true cost of a major weapon system throughout its 
entire life.  [Ref. 12:p. 137] 
Knowing that Congress would never accept a million dollar 
tank, BG Baer decided on using the Pentagon approved DTUC and 
the magic number was set at $507,790 per tank (measured in FY 
1972 dollars). Estimating the best they knew how, the cost 
committee and BG Baer would have to live by that figure for a 
number of years. Almost as important, the PM knew that 
Congress would measure his performance and success or failure 
by that figure alone. This cost threshold would repeatedly 
haunt and almost kill the entire tank program over the ensuing 
years.  [Ref. 12:pp. 136-137] 
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In the Acquisition Plan (1st Endorsement) dated March 
1975, total estimated program acquisition costs from program 
initiation through completion of quantity production (3,312 
vehicles) was $5,045 million. Figure 4 depicts estimated 
program costs by fiscal year (FY) . ' Two important notes 
follow: 
the RDT&E costs exclude $20 million in sunk costs 
for FY72 initial start-up 'concept studies'. 
FY7 6 through completion costs are based on January 
1975 inflation indices.  [Ref. 16:p. 4] 
($ in Millions) 
Balance to 
FY73   FY74   FY75  FY76  FY77   FY78  FY79  Completion Total 
RDT&E   21.5  54.0   65.0  50.2  142.6   95.2   49.9    11.5 489.9 
PEMA     0     0 2.0   0 45.6  109.4  387.3  4010.8 4555.1 
Total    21.5  54.0   67.0  50.2  188.2  204.6  437.2  4022.3 5045.0 
Figure 4  1975 Estimated Program Costs 
[Ref. 16:p. 4] 
b.       Source Selection 
Selecting two manufacturers to build tank prototypes 
for Phase I was a congressional mandate which fit in with the 
then popular Fly-Before-You-Buy procurement practice. Many 
companies showed an interest in the tank program and 98 were 
present for the initial bidders' conference. Only the 'Big 
Three' auto-makers, Ford, Chrysler, and GM, were expected to 
show a serious interest. Requests for Proposals (RFP) were 
sent to potential contractors on 23 January 1973 and only 
Chrysler and GM submitted proposals. Ford, who had not 
manufactured tanks since WW II, gave the project serious 
consideration but dropped out when Israeli tank designers on 
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their staff could not obtain security clearances. On 28 June 
1973 developmental contracts were awarded to both Chrysler and 
GM. [Ref. 12:pp. 138-140] Chrysler won the competitive 
prototype validation phase and was awarded the engineering 
development contract. In addition, they also were awarded the 
follow-on full scale production contract in 1979 on a sole- 
source basis. [Ref. 14:pp. B-6 thru B-8] 
2.   Subsequent PMs 
Five years after assignment as the PM, BG(P) Donald M. 
Babers replaced MG Baer in June of 1977. BG(P) Babers would 
remain the PM through June 1980, seeing his dedication and 
hard labor come to fruition as the first two Ml Abrams 
production tanks were delivered in February 1980. Babers also 
played a key role in the initiation of the 120mm main gun 
system development and integration program for incorporation 
into the future MlAl tank scheduled to begin production in FY 
1985.  [Ref. 14:pp. B-6 thru B-9] 
MG Duard D. Ball replaced MG Babers in July 1980 and 
witnessed the program reach IOC in January 1981. He played an 
instrumental role in the SECDEF's decision to proceed with 
full-rate production of the Ml at a rate of 60 vehicles per 
month (30 each at DATP and LATP) . In March 1982 the first 
full-scale production tanks were delivered from the DATP and 
by August of that same year, five Army battalions had been 
fielded and trained.  [Ref. 14:pp. B-9 thru B-ll] 
The last basic Ml Abrams tank was produced in January 
1985, bringing the total number manufactured to 2,374. The 
improved tank version, designated the IPMl, entered production 
in December 1984 and for over twelve months both were produced 
concurrently. 
A total of 8,101 Abrams tanks were produced for the 
United States military since program inception in 1972. As of 
August 1993, production figures including Foreign Military 
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M1A2  . .62 
Total U.S 8,101 
M1A1 Egypt  .550 
M1A2 Saudi Arabia 70 0 
M1A2 Kuwait........ .  .760 
Total 10,111 
[Ref. 21:p. 18-19] 
E.   SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided a broad overview of the 
acquisition history for the Ml Abrams Tank Program. A 
description of the tank to include its significant features 
and characteristics has also been outlined. An overview of 
the major program management issues has been addressed in 
preparation for an in-depth review of the acquisition strategy 
discussed in the next chapter. 
The newly-designed and developed Ml tank met or exceeded 
all the design and performance specifications required by the 
Army. It has provided increased performance in the areas of 
survivability, tactical mobility, night fighting capability, 
fire-on-the-move capability, and hit probability. Clearly, 
this new tank was,, and still is, capable of meeting and 
defeating the projected threat of the 1980's and beyond. 
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IV.  THE Ml ABRAMS TANK PROGRAM ACQUISITION STRATEGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides an in-depth overview of the Ml 
Abrams program acquisition strategy. The development of a 
tailored acquisition strategy by the PM is both a difficult 
and challenging task. A multitude of requirements must be 
blended in order to provide a conceptual basis for the overall 
program plan that the PM will follow throughout program 
execution. The development of this strategy is one of the 
first tasks that must be completed at the onset of a new 
program and the PM is forced to make many key decisions up 
front and early which will have tremendous impacts throughout 
the program's life-cycle. 
The list of strategic options for major systems 
acquisition is lengthy. The following strategies for the Ml 
Abrams tank program are addressed: competition, concurrency, 
design-to-cost, pre-planned product improvement (P3I) , and 
incentives. These strategic alternatives, although not all- 
inclusive, formed the foundation for success of this program. 
B. Ml ABRAMS TANK ACQUISITION STRATEGY 
The acquisition strategy for this program was unique from 
its inception. In June of 1972, the Department of the Army 
published the Material Acquisition Guidelines (MAG) which, 
among other guiding principles, established a 'standard' six- 
year development program for new major weapon system 
acquisition programs. However, the procurement philosophy for 
the Ml program was based on a seven-year development concept. 
The most significant benefit of the seven-year development 
program over the six-year period, was a drastic reduction in 
the degree of technical risk associated with achieving the 
required levels of armor protection within the weight limits 
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imposed. This new technology would take a substantial amount 
of time to perfect and the addition of one year to the program 
provided the necessary flexibility required to mitigate this 
inherent risk.  [Ref. 22:p. 2] 
1.   Competition 
Because of the unique, military-specific nature of the 
Defense sector, competition in this market is both imperfect 
and, for the most part, monopsonistic (only one buyer). 
Qualified sources are usually very limited in number and there 
are few sellers who can deliver a quality product at a 
reasonable price. Competition is one approach utilized to 
constrain cost growth while simultaneously capturing the 
technological ingenuity of private industry. Maintaining a 
strong and flexible defense industrial base is another 
consideration when discussing the merits of competition as it 
relates to Government procurement.  [Ref. 7:p. 5-2] 
The Ml Abrams tank program utilized competition during 
its DEM/VAL phase although qualified competitors in this 
exclusive market were, obviously, limited. During the EMD 
phase, one contractor (Chrysler Defense) was selected and 
awarded the sole-source prime contract. In the mid 1970s, 
this competitive strategy was standard practice for a 
developmental program of this magnitude and it is still a 
common practice today. Although the first rendition of the 
procurement strategy recommended a sole-source contract for 
initial and follow-on production, this strategy was later 
determined to be 'suspect' and revised to include competition 
for full-scale production.  [Ref. 16:p. 2] 
In addition to the aforementioned competitive strategy, 
"break-out" was also included as an option during follow-on 
production. Break-out is defined as the practice of selective 
competition whereby "...critical subsystems or components are 
selected for competitive production in out-year buys." [Ref. 
7:p. 5-5] Usually, those components selected for breakout are 
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procured by the Government from industry direct and then 
provided to the prime contractor as Government-Furnished 
Equipment (GFE) or Government Furnished Material (GFM). [Ref. 
23 :p. B-ll] The foresight of this alternative, recurrent 
option would prove to be very valuable throughout the 
program's life. 
During the first two years of production, Chrysler 
Defense purchased and manufactured most of the components and 
materials necessary to fabricate and assemble the complete Ml 
tank. The exceptions were: the main gun, machine guns, 
ammunition, communications equipment, basic issue items (BII), 
driver's night sight, and NBC components. [Ref. 19:p. 29] 
Beginning with the third year of production (FY 1981), four 
components were selected for break-out and were provided as 
GFM. Two components were procured sole-source and two were 
competed.   These four components were: 
ITEM SOURCE 
AGT 150 0 Turbine Engine AVCO 
X1100-3B Transmission Allison Transmission Div. 
Final Drive Competitive 
Track (T-158) Competitive 
[Ref. 19:pp. 20] 
The Government invested in excess of $1 billion to 
establish interdependent production facilities and this large 
investment became the program's leading justification for 
requesting a sole-source selection for follow-on production. 
[Ref. 19 :p. 19] The exception utilized was based on the 
judgement that any award to another source would result in: 
...substantial duplication of cost to the 
Government that would not be expected to be 
recovered through competition, and introduction of 
another source at this time would cause an 
unacceptable  delay  in  fulfilling  the  Army's 
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requirements. [Ref. 19:p. 23] 
If a new source were introduced, a minimum of a two-year break 
in production would have occurred since it was unlikely that 
competitive benefits would or could support a duplication of 
the initial facility investment. Since General Dynamic Land 
System's (GDLS) purchase of Chrysler Defense in February 1982, 
their proven performance record has justified continued sole- 
source procurement to be the most beneficial to the Government 
in terms of cost and readiness. As late as 1990, sole-source 
for production was still utilized since production quality was 
high, deliveries were on time or ahead of schedule, and the 
high start-up costs for a new contractor precluded new prime 
contractor competition. [Ref.l9:pp. 21-23] 
a. Advantages of Competition 
The advantages of competition include: 
• Obtaining a lower price for a product 
Obtaining a higher quality product 
• Expanding the industrial base 
Enhancing surge capacity in an emergency 
• Providing more than one source for product 
innovation 
• Stimulating research and development 
Encouraging an incumbent to be more cost- 
conscious 
Encourage the incumbent to be more responsive 
to the concerns of the buyer and to address 
criticisms.  [Ref. 7:p. 5-3] 
b.       Disadvantages of Competition 
The disadvantages of competition include: 
Increased initial cost due to duplication of 
the work to administer contracts, prepare to 
produce a product, or accomplish a specific 
task 
More complex and costly support of duplicate 
products in the field 
Variations  in  quality between  competitive 
products 
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Time and cost to educate second source (can 
delay fielding of future units) 
Weakening of any working relationship that 
exists between a specific contractor and the 
Program Office  [Ref. 7:p. 5-3] 
2.   Concurrency 
In an effort to shorten the ever-increasing acquisition 
cycle, concurrency is one approach utilized by PMs to shorten 
the time required to achieve an IOC. Concurrency is that part 
of an acquisition strategy where there is: 
...an overlap of activities constituting at least 
part of full-scale development, transition to 
production, achievement of production rate, and 
initial deployment of the system. Concurrency can 
also occur through elimination of a phase or 
overlapping of phases in the acquisition process. 
[Ref. 7:p. 5-14] 
Concurrency is often necessary to compress or shorten the 
development and testing cycle in order to meet the acquisition 
system's pre-planned schedule. If cost and schedule were of 
little concern, the normative approach would be to conduct 
design, test, production, and deployment sequentially, thus 
allowing adequate time to fix any resultant deficiencies. 
Unfortunately, this sequential scenario is too time-consuming 
and costly.  [Ref. 7:p. 5-14] 
The Ml Abrams tank program planned concurrency during EMD 
in order to meet its aggressive development schedule. DT and 
OT were conducted simultaneously and both displayed numerous 
problems. With only eleven prototype vehicles available for 
test and evaluation and none on-hand at the plant on which to 
evaluate corrective measures, replicating and solving the 
problems identified at the test sites became a time-consuming, 
difficult task. However, both the program office and the 
contractor were able to surmount this obstacle through great 
teamwork, ingenuity, diligence, and unity of effort. [Ref. 
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12:pp. 161&162; 
a.  Advantages of Concurrency 
The advantages of concurrency are: 
Achievement of an earlier operational 
capability 
•    Possible reductions in cost for the shorter 
period 
Design  maturity  and  production  start-up 
problems become visible earlier 
Production articles are usually closer in 
configuration to test articles  [Ref.7:p. 5- 
16] 
b.       Disadvantages of Concurrency 
The disadvantages of concurrency stem from the 
inherent risks associated with a complex, technologically 
advanced system in terms of: 
• Performance shortfalls 
• Schedule slippage 
Cost growth  [Ref. 7:p. 5-16] 
3.   Design-to-Cost (DTC) 
The Acquisition Strategy Guide defines DTC as: 
An acquisition management technique to achieve 
defense system designs that meet stated cost 
requirements. Cost is addressed on a continuing 
basis as part of a system's development and 
production process.  [Ref. 7:p. 5-23] 
This cost control mechanism is designed to track contractor 
costs throughout the design, development, and production of a 
system in order to identify and highlight any major changes to 
original estimates. Excessive cost growth in major weapon 
systems programs can lead to a quick and early project 
termination.  Cost growths occur for a number of reasons, 
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primarily because of: poor initial cost estimates, cost 
escalation due to inflation, changes in requirements, and 
quantity changes. Design and performance trade-offs are often 
utilized to maintain costs under an established, preset 
ceiling.  [Ref. 7:p. 5-24] 
For the Ml tank program, the DTC goal was set at $507,790 
per tank (FY 1972 dollars) and this estimate was established 
as the average unit 'roll-away' cost. [Ref. 12:p. 136] This 
figure included Government Furnished Material (GFM), 
contractor manufacturing, and engineering support through 
production of 3,312 vehicles at a rate of 30 vehicles per 
month. When the total production figure was increased to 
7,058 tanks and the second production facility at Lima, Ohio 
was brought on-line, the DTC was revised to $611,340 (FY 1972 
dollars) but was never formally approved.  [Ref. 14:p. B-6] 
a. Advantages of Design-to-Cost 
The advantages of DTC are: 
It defines a measurable design parameter; 
often considered as important as 
performance 
• It provides a basis for communication and 
coordination of effort between the Government 
and industry participants  [Ref. 7:p. 5-24] 
b. Disadvantages of Design-to-Cost 
The disadvantages of DTC are: 
• It forces the PM to commit to a DTC goal 
well before final agreement on 
configuration and operational 
requirements; thus the need to 'sell' the 
program may drive the DTC goals down to 
unrealistic levels 
• Additional   administrative   support   is 
required to plan and execute the DTC program 
Existence of the DTC program could tend to 
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inhibit tailoring and innovation 
[Ref, 7:p. 5-24] 
4.   Pre-Planned Product Improvements (P3I) 
P3I is an increasingly popular strategy in today's highly 
technological Defense industry.  P3I enables a PM to: 
...develop and field a new weapon system while 
improvements to that system are being planned for 
phased integration. It is a systematic and orderly 
acquisition strategy beginning at the system's 
concept phase to facilitate evolutionary, cost- 
effective upgrading of a system throughout the life 
cycle to enhance readiness, availability, and 
capability.  [Ref. 7:p. 5-46] 
If technology or the threat changes during system development, 
the system can either be redesigned (which is extremely 
costly) or it can be modified after fielding at a later date 
(affordability issue). P3I is a planned evolutionary growth 
which affords the PM a means of incorporating state-of-the-art 
technology not yet perfected without having to develop an 
entirely new system. It also provides a mechanism so that 
multiple, advanced technologies will not have to be 
incorporated all at once thereby increasing program risk, 
interface, and reliability deficiencies.  [Ref. 7:p. 5-46] 
Frequently during design and development, the need for 
eventual modification is recognized. Hopefully, the need for 
modification is identified early on and a plan is quickly 
developed.   Such is the case with the Ml tank program. 
During prototype validation, debate over the size of the 
main gun became a sensitive issue. Some wanted the proven 
American 105 mm main gun and others wanted to incorporate the 
newly designed German 12 0 mm main gun. Since there was not an 
established plan available for a main gun demonstration and 
evaluation, an alternate plan of action was quickly reached. 
Both contractors had to design the turret of the tank to be 
capable of accepting either the 105 mm or the 12 0 mm main gun. 
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Although a shoot-off was eventually conducted, the American 
105 mm was chosen not because it was superior, but because it 
was proven technology. The recommendation to delay 
incorporating the German 12 0 mm main gun until further studies 
and testing were conducted was made in the fall of 1975 and, 
thus, a P3I strategy was adopted.  [Ref. 12:pp. 175-177] 
As part of P3I, several improvements were considered for 
incorporation into the subsequent acquisition plan of the MlAl 
tank program. Several improvements were incorporated into the 
plan in 1984 including a: Improved Commander's Weapon Station, 
Commander's Independent Thermal Viewer, CO2 Laser Rangefinder, 
Driver's Thermal Viewer, fast refuel, and enhanced smoke 
generation capability. These improvements provide the United 
States fighting soldier with the most sophisticated, lethal 
tank on the modern battlefield and all were adeptly 
incorporated by utilizing the P3I concept.   [Ref. 19:p. 8] 
a. Advantages of Pre-Planned Product 
Improvements 
The following advantages result from an effective 
implementation of P3I: 
Responsiveness  to  threat  changes  and 
future technology development 
Earlier IOC date for baseline system 
Reduced development risks 
Potential for subsystem competition 
Enhanced operational capability for 'final' 
system 
Stimulation for laboratory and independent R&D 
research 
• Increased effective operational life 
[Ref. 7:p. 5-47] 
b. Disadvantages of Pre-Planned Product 
Improvements 
The following disadvantages of using P3I include: 
• Increased  nonrecurring   cost   during 
initial development 
• Increased technical requirements in such areas 
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as space, weight, power, and cooling 
Increased   complexity   in   configuration 
management 
Vulnerability to 'gold plating' criticism and 
funding cuts 
Compounding system management problems because 
of parallel developments 
Interference with the orderly development and 
implementation of effective support plans and 
procedures  [Ref. 7:p. 5-47] 
5.   Incentives 
Incentivizing a contractor to perform in a realistic, 
cost-effective, and responsible manner is accomplished through 
the development and implementation of a contractual strategy. 
Incentive contracts are utilized to: 
...motivate the contractor to meet or exceed target 
levels when there is uncertainty about the outcome 
and the contractor has some control of the outcome. 
[Ref. 7:p. 5-29] 
Incentive contracts typically reward the contractor for 
meeting or exceeding defined goals with a monetary 
remuneration, and, likewise, penalize the contractor for 
failure to meet these goals. It is a definitive means of 
encouraging contractors to achieve more than minimum program 
objectives without excessive risk.  [Ref. 7:p. 5-29] 
The written contract is the legal basis on which the 
Government and contractor relationship and responsibilities 
are definitized and delineated. Two broad categories of 
contract type exist: cost-reimbursable and fixed-price. Cost- 
reimbursable contracts are defined as contracts in which the 
contractor "...provides best efforts to meet the contract 
terms and conditions and the Government pays all of the 
allowable costs that meet the test of reasonableness." [Ref. 
7:p. 5-29] Fixed-price contracts, on the other hand, require 
the contractor to "...provide the required product or service 
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at a predetermined price, regardless of the actual cost." 
[Ref. 7:p. 5-29] 
There are advantages and disadvantages to both types of 
contracts. Cost-reimbursable contracts are typically utilized 
when there is high technical risk associated with development 
and the financial risk is equitably shared by both the 
contractor and the Government. Because the contractor is paid 
all allocable and allowable costs, contractors are usually 
less motivated to control their costs. Conversely, fixed- 
price contracts are used with lower risk technology and this 
contract type places more financial responsibility on the 
contractor to control his costs and, thereby, protect his 
profit margin.   [Ref. 7:pp. 5-29 thru 5-32] 
The Ml tank program initially planned on awarding the 
competitive prototype validation contractors a Fixed-Price- 
Incentive-Firm (FPIF) contract with incentive on cost only. 
A FPIF contract was initially selected because: "...from a 
contractor standpoint, the risk associated with failure is 
minimal." [Ref. 22:p. 13] The objective of this contract 
type was to: 
• Assure   that   maximum   performance 
objectives were achieved at minimum cost 
Provide  cost  visibility  desired  by  the 
Government during performance 
• Allocate equitable Government/contractor share 
of the associated risk 
Not unduly penalize contractors for failure to 
meet performance goals  [Ref. 22:p. 13] 
However, in June of 1973, competitively negotiated Cost-Plus- 
Incentive-Fee (CPIF) contracts for Phase I were awarded 
allowing both contractors the largest possible amount of 
design freedom. The contract had performance-based 
requirements and the incentive was on cost of contract 
performance only.  [Ref. 16:p. 8] 
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Winning the DEM/VAL phase, Chrysler Defense was awarded 
a FPIF contract for EMD which also included the first two 
years of production. The contractor retained configuration 
control throughout this period and the PM incorporated a 
provision for the correction of deficiencies in delivered 
vehicles due to the concurrency of production and 
developmental testing. This correction of deficiencies 
provision was very similar to a warranty against defects. As 
part of this contract, a competitively-derived ceiling priced 
option was included with an advance award of 25-3 0% of the 
total tank system production cost. This advance award was 
included to offset long-lead material and production special 
tooling and test equipment requirements. To offset this risk 
to the Government, the prime contractor was instructed to 
obtain competitively-derived ceiling priced options from major 
sub-component subcontractors. The PM assumed configuration 
control beginning with the third year of production. Annual 
contracts for production between 1981 and 1983 were Firm-Fixed 
Price (FFP). [Ref. 19:pp. 7-15] 
a.   Advantages of Incentives 
• Provide greater realism in negotiating 
• Increase cost-consciousness 
Encourage Government/contractor cooperation 
• Recognize limitations of contractor management 
and control systems 
• Account for motivational variability 
• Provide the contractor flexibility in meeting 
target values   [Ref. 7:p. 5-30] 
b.       Disadvantages of Incentives 
• The cost and complexity of administration 
are increased 
• It is difficult to establish realistic targets 
There is a tendency to create incentives for 
too many elements, leading to complex, poorly 
50 
understood relationships 
Contract complications arise from Government- 
directed changes 
The profit motive, the essence of incentive 
contracting, may not be the prime motive of 
the contractor   [Ref. 7:p. 5-30] 
SUMMARY 
This chapter has highlighted the key strategic decisions 
made by the initial PM, BG Baer, at the inception of the Ml 
Abrams tank program. Once made, these decisions had an 
overwhelming impact on the stability, functionability, and 
longevity of the program during the ensuing years. This is 
not to say that once a strategic decision is made it can not 
be changed. However, to change a 'game plan' after the kick- 
off often invites outside skepticism and unsolicited program 
scrutiny and oversight. 
Competition, concurrency, design-to-cost, pre-planned 
product improvements, and incentives are just a few of the 
multitude of strategic options available to a PM as he plans 
and charts the course his program will follow. The next 




V.  ANALYSIS AND LESSONS-LEARNED FROM THE Ml ABRAMS 
ACQUISITION STRATEGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides an analysis of the successful 
acquisition strategy for the Ml Abrams tank program. Previous 
chapters have presented the historical facts behind the Ml 
acquisition and its acquisition strategy. To determine why 
this program's acquisition strategy was notable, the factors 
that influenced this program's success, as well as the 
shortcomings that occurred during execution, are analyzed. 
This analysis is performed utilizing the acquisition strategy 
evaluation criteria of realism, stability, flexibility, and 
controlled risk, as established in the Acquisition Strategy 
Guide. Lessons-learned are identified from these factors 
which can be practically applied to future major weapon system 
programs. 
B. ANALYSIS OF THE Ml TANK'S ACQUISITION STRATEGY 
To label a weapon system program 'successful' solely 
because the system was eventually fielded is both 
irresponsible and simple-minded. Although a relative term, 
success in this analysis is defined as meeting the needs of 
the user in a cost-effective and timely manner. The Ml Abrams 
tank program is considered successful because the program 
achieved its primary goal of satisfying an identified, 
validated mission need. This program fielded an extremely 
effective weapon system and it is currently considered by 
military experts to be the most lethal, survivable tank on the 
modern battlefield. The Ml tank has met the Army's material 
and mission needs and it far exceeded its original performance 
objectives.   Although cost and schedule objectives were 
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narrowly exceeded, the Mi's increased performance capabilities 
and advanced armor protection have offset any shortcomings. 
1.   Realism 
An acquisition strategy is realistic if the program 
objectives  are  attainable  and  the  strategic 
approach to satisfying them can be successfully 
implemented with reasonable assurance.  [Ref. 7:p. 
3-9] 
When analyzing this program's acquisition strategy, two 
questions must be examined: 
Was the proposed system the best solution to the 
mission need and were the program's cost and 
schedule estimates realistic? 
Was the program's acquisition strategy and plan a 
reasonable and realistic means of achieving the 
Army's identified material need? 
To answer both questions, the Army's mission need must be 
examined in conjunction with the fundamental strategic options 
incorporated into the acquisition strategy. 
At the inception of the Ml program in 1972, the M-60 
tank's operational deficiencies were clearly evident and well- 
documented throughout the armor community. The introduction 
of the Soviet T-62 and T-64 model tanks in the early and late 
1960s stimulated apprehension among United States military 
analysts. With an improved and larger main gun, lower vehicle 
silhouette, and a more powerful engine, the T-64 tank was 
categorized as one more premier and dominant vehicle in the 
Soviet military arsenal. [Ref. 12:pp.17-21] Because the M-60 
tank was already a. piece-meal conglomeration of tank 
technology, the concept of modifying and/or upgrading this 
system was determined to be an inviable option. The material 
need for a new and improved tank was not only justified, but 
amply supported by both the Pentagon and Capitol Hill. 
Early establishment of performance-based specifications 
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with only six mandatory requirements afforded the DEM/VAL 
contractors the freedom to develop and design a tank within 
the minimum established performance parameters. This latitude 
permitted both competitors to conduct trade-off analyses on a 
variety of tank system features and enabled them to freely 
incorporate the most promising technological hardware. 
Negotiating a Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee (CPIF) contract with a 
well-established budget limitation provided a reasonable 
constraint to an otherwise risky development. Once 
established, this cost ceiling forced both contractors to 
design and develop their prototype vehicles within a modest 
budget. Selection of this contract type minimized the 
addition of unnecessary 'bells and whistles' and unnecessarily 
expensive 'gold-plating'. 
The incorporation of a seven-year development plan was 
critical in establishing a realistic and reasonable schedule 
at the onset of the program. In the early 1970's, both 
military research and development (R&D) laboratories and 
private industry were experimenting with new armor technology. 
Solidifying the PM's decision to opt for a seven-year program 
was the realization that this R&D effort was on the verge of 
a scientific break-through. Allocating the time necessary to 
perfect this new technology exhibited great foresight on 
behalf of the PM. This development schedule was neither 
overly optimistic nor conservative in nature; it proved to be 
a wise balance of both. 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, acquisition strategies 
incorporated a high degree of concurrency between the 
development and production phases. The Ml program was no 
exception to this norm. Although the aforementioned seven- 
year plan allowed adequate time for technological ingenuity, 
it was, nonetheless, a time-table established without much 
room for error. Concurrency of developmental and operational 
testing (DT/OT) was predicated on sound reasoning, namely to 
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reduce the time necessary :o begin Low-Rate Initial Production 
(LRIP) .    Initial problems with engine and transmission 
failures,  thrown tank track, and inadequate operator and 
maintenance manuals were eventually rectified with little 
impact on the schedule. Although a major source of concern at 
the time,  the insufficient number of prototype vehicles 
available for testing proved to be just one of many obstacles 
the PM/contractor team successfully surmounted.   Overall, 
concurrency proved very effective and was instrumental in 
maintaining the program's aggressive developmental schedule. 
One noteworthy weakness impacting strategic realism 
resulted from underestimated design-to-cost (DTC) appraisals. 
Because justification for program funding was very competitive 
and Congress had previously stated they would not accept a 
million dollar tank, the PM and other program advocates were 
predisposed to 'sell' their program with a less than realistic 
cost estimate.  Lacking the cost estimation techniques and 
trained personnel available today, the proposed $507,790 (FY 
1972 dollars) sticker price per tank was somewhat undervalued. 
The program did remarkably well, however, in keeping costs 
under control and remained fairly close to the original 
estimate.  Unfortunately, two unforeseen events precipitated 
the increased cost per tank: 
An unanticipated, larger than normal rise in the 
inflation rate between 1974 and 1982. 
The incorporation of the 12 0mm main gun upgrade 
coupled with the decision to more than double the 
number of tanks to be produced (from 3,312 to 
7,058). 
Changes late in any program normally have a detrimental 
impact, particularly on cost and schedule.  In defense of the 
PM, none of the above mentioned factors could  have been 
anticipated.  In fact: 
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In 1988, a decade and a half after the rather 
artificial design-to-unit-cost goal was set at 
$5 07,790, the Army claimed that the individual 
tank,... was coming in at just a little over that 
price - in 1972 dollars.  [Ref. 12:p. 250] 
In retrospect, it is clear that development of the Ml 
Abrams tank was the best solution to the identified mission 
need.  Cost and schedule estimates were both reasonable and 
realistic.  This program's acquisition strategy, as developed 
and implemented, provides a positive example of realism in 
today's DoD acquisition and procurement environment. 
2.  Stability- 
Acquisition stability is the characteristic that 
inhibits negative external or internal influences 
from  seriously  disrupting  program  progress, 
which...frequently  causes  changes  in  cost, 
schedule,  or performance requirements that can 
threaten the achievement of milestones.  [Ref. 7:p. 
3-13] 
From program inception through the late 1980's this tank 
program has been a model of stability. This, however, is not 
to say it never encountered problems. Three critical factors 
provided a stable, steady program platform; without any one of 
which, the success of the program would have suffered. These 
critical factors were: 
• High-level advocacy and commitment throughout the 
Army, the Pentagon, and from Capitol Hill. 
• A coupling of PM stability and longevity with a 
unity of effort philosophy throughout the chain of 
command. 
Critical mid-stream changes were handled with 
extreme efficiency and, when necessary, were 
incorporated into a Pre-Planned Product Improvement 
(P3I) program. 
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a.       Program Advocacy 
Rebuilding a hollow, somewhat obsolescent Army at 
the conclusion of the Vietnam War in the early 1970's became 
a top priority inside the Pentagon. Realization that the 
expense of the war had resulted in a complete failure to 
maintain an edge in research and development efforts as well 
as procurement of modernized, state-of-the-art equipment, 
forced top leadership officials to prioritize new weapon 
system programs. At least nine major new weapon systems were 
vying with one another for a big slice of the Army's shrinking 
budget. [Ref. 12:p. 87] The highest priority went toward the 
development of a new tank and this early prioritization forced 
the Army to speak with one voice. This up-front, unified 
commitment within the Army was critical in fostering the 
support necessary from Congress and special interest groups 
and enhancing program advocacy at its highest level. 
Understanding the fine-line limitations of this Congressional 
support, i.e. the economical, technological, and societal 
implications, was key in harboring and maintaining unified 
commitment. The Ml Abrams tank program evidently maintained 
this support and this factor alone, contributed greatly to its 
overall success. 
h.        PM Stability 
One way to enhance stability inside an organization 
is by establishing and maintaining a coherent, well-balanced 
management structure. When Chief of Staff of the Army, 
General Abrams, appointed BG Baer as the initial PM for the 
program, the first thing he did was give Baer a seven-page 
charter with a direct channel of communication to both himself 
and the Secretary of the Army. Incorporating the top 
representative of the user community, MG Starry, Commandant of 
the Armor Center, into the fold of this management hierarchy 
solidified the cooperation and viability between the input of 
the user community and the PM's acquisition strategy for 
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accomplishing the production of a world-class tank. The close 
personal and working relationship between BG Baer, MG Starry, 
and General Abrams, was another key to the early success of 
this program. 
Each PM served a minimum of three years as the head of 
the program, with BG Baer serving five years at the helm at 
program inception. This low turn-over rate of principal 
management, was extremely important and laid a firm foundation 
from the program's start. Changes in organization and 
personnel can cause major disruptions and undermine 
continuity. This pitfall was consciously avoided with 
orderly, well-timed, PM changes that coincided with major 
milestone decision points. Continuity and stability were 
maximized to every extent possible within the program office. 
c.       Managing Change 
Two major changes incorporated during the program 
were: the main gun upgrade from the 105mm to the 120mm and the 
quantity of tanks to be produced. Although ominous in nature 
and potentially devastating to any program, both changes were 
carefully analyzed and thoroughly planned. 
Recognizing the overall impact of the hotly debated, 
sensitive issue of main gun size early during prototype 
validation afforded both the PM and the contractors the 
opportunity to develop and incorporate a turret design which 
was capable of handling either size main gun. This early 
anticipation of future product modification was critical to 
the implementation of a P3I strategy. Further study and 
testing was necessary on the immature technology of the 12 0mm 
main gun and this realization helped to delay its 
incorporation for several years; a very prudent and wise 
decision on behalf of the entire program's leadership. This 
planned evolutionary growth implemented through the use of the 
P3I strategy, afforded the PM a means of incorporating 
technology not yet perfected without having to develop an 
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entirely new system. As previously mentioned, the 120mm main 
gun upgrade was incorporated into the M1A1 Abrams Tank in 
1985. 
The decision to more than double the number of tanks to 
be produced from 3,312 to 7,058, although not affecting 
design, still had repercussions on the program. Once again, 
the early timing of such a drastic change offset what could 
have been an adverse, overly-expensive decision to implement. 
Recommendations to increase production quantities first 
surfaced in 1977, two years before LRIP commenced. [Ref. 
14 :p. B-6] Because planning commenced early, adequate time 
was available to procure long-lead items. In addition, the 
establishment of a second fully-operational, modern production 
facility in Lima, Ohio provided the necessary production 
capacity required to handle this quantity increase. 
3.   Flexibility 
Flexibility is a characteristic of the acquisition 
strategy related to the ease with which changes and 
failures can be accommodated without significant 
changes in resource requirements.  [Ref. 7:p. 3-17] 
Flexibility in a strategic context involves contingency 
planning or 'what if?' war-gaming. Providing a back-up or 
alternative method of meeting an objective is one of the best 
means available to cope with change. [Ref. 7:p. 3-17] Time 
available is one of the most important elements when dealing 
with change and uncertainty and this consideration was 
factored into the Ml program from the very beginning when a 
seven-year development plan was implemented. The addition of 
one year to the program provided a safe measure of flexibility 
and ample buffer space to manage unexpected change. 
Several of the implemented acquisition strategies either 
addressed or accounted for program flexibility. The use of 
performance specifications allowed great freedom to both 
contractors to design a system within the minimum parameters 
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required during prototype validation. The eventual 
negotiation of a CPIF contract for EMD provided flexibility to 
both the contractor and the PM. This contract type allowed 
the contractor to retain latitude and flexibility in meeting 
pre-set target levels, while simultaneously providing the 
Government with flexible incentive options if any changes were 
required. 
Additional flexibility was incorporated through the use 
of concurrency during DT/OT. The use of LRIP also provided a 
large degree of flexibility by allowing the manufacturing and 
production process to be continually refined at a lower cost 
while deficiencies were corrected. Utilizing both "break-out" 
during follow-on production and second-sourcing also added 
flexibility by providing an alternative source of supply in 
the event that one failed to meet its requirements. 
Several safeguards were incorporated into the Ml Abrams 
acquisition strategy. Identifying and planning early for 
those areas displaying the highest probability of change was 
clearly evident and proved to be another critical factor in 
the success of this program. 
4.   Controlled Risk 
Risk, as applied to acquisition strategy, is a 
measure of the probability and consequence of not 
achieving a defined program goal.  [Ref. 7:p. 3-20] 
Dealing with inherent risk and uncertainty is the 
fundamental management challenge that all PMs face. Charting 
a successful program course through system production and 
fielding involves identification, assessment, and planning for 
the unknown. Risk mitigation is the underlying purpose behind 
the development and implementation of an acquisition strategy. 
The Ml tank program was clearly successful in 
identifying, analyzing, and minimizing risk throughout program 
execution.   The three key elements of the Ml acquisition 
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strategy which minimized risky alternatives were: 
• Combining a seven-year development plan with P3I. 
• Fly-Before-Buy prototype validation. 
Early  and  continuous  interaction  between  the 
program office and the end-user community. 
a. Seven-Year Development Plan and  P'J 
The Ml tank program minimized technical risk by 
allocating the time necessary to fully develop, test, and 
integrate its new armor technology. Because this new armor 
technology would heavily impact weight constraints and 
virtually every other design facet of the tank, providing the 
time necessary to perfect this technology was critical to 
achieving the cost, schedule, and performance parameters of 
the entire program. In addition, the P3I concept provided a 
means of incorporating late design improvements and 
performance enhancements to the tank in an orderly, 
systematic, pre-planned manner without affecting schedule. 
Risk was addressed and minimized by the proper allocation of 
a critical resource: time. 
b. Fly-Before-Buy Prototype Validation 
Combining performance-based  specifications  with 
competitive prototype validation during DEM/VAL enabled the 
Army to choose the best tank design that fit its need. 
Performance specifications allowed both contractors the 
freedom to explore solutions and to demonstrate technology in 
a competitive environment under Army direction. The program 
office, through a Fly-Before-Buy prototype demonstration, was 
able to assess and evaluate each system's configuration, 
design, and performance capability, and award a contract to 
the one who best fulfilled its need. 
Allowing both contractors to demonstrate their 
technological solutions in the form of fully-operational, 
functional prototypes clearly reduced program risk. 
Evaluation of each proposed design through actual hands-on 
62 
manipulation is inherently less risky than a computer- 
generated model or blue-print design analysis. In addition, 
because the Army funded the Fly-Before-Buy prototype research 
and validation, it was free to incorporate all the good points 
from the unsuccessful competitor into the winning design. 
c.       Continuous  Interaction Between the Program 
Office and the End-user Community 
Because the PM depends on the user for continuous 
input to many of the required documents for milestone decision 
reviews, program success can not be achieved without close and 
continuous user participation.  [Ref. 24:p. 31.19] Obviously, 
the end-user is involved in the requirements generation 
process of a major weapon system.  However, the role the user 
plays in the total acquisition process to include: design, 
development, test and evaluation, deployment, and logistical 
support, is essential.  This user influence, however, must be 
carefully balanced by the PM in terms of overall program 
objectives. One way to reduce program risk and uncertainty is 
to maintain continuous interaction and feedback between the 
program office and the demands of the user.  Serious problems 
may arise when the user does not understand the impact of 
changes in requirements to the three critical areas of cost, 
schedule, and performance. 
The Ml tank program maintained excellent communications 
between the PM and the armor community. Clearly, this program 
incorporated user involvement early in the acquisition process 
and maintained this very important role throughout the entire 
management process. 
C.   LESSONS-LEARNED 
The intended purpose of lessons-learned: 
...is to provide a means to systematically access, 
scrutinize, and choose from past experiences those 
lessons we can apply in a new situation with a high 
probability that their use will result in a better 
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course of action and results than would have been 
expected without their use.  [Ref. 24:p. 44.2] 
Six important lessons are derived from this case study. 
• Use of performance-based specifications with well- 
established minimum requirements allows competing 
contractors the freedom to explore solutions and to 
conduct trade-off analysis on a variety of system 
features. Performance-based specifications enable 
contractors to freely incorporate the most 
promising technological hardware during the 
development and design process. 
Fostering program advocacy at the highest level 
from program inception is critical in the current 
era of shrinking Defense expenditures. 
Congressional support is paramount to program 
funding and, thus, program survival. 
• Maintaining continuity of key personnel, especially 
the Program Manager, is critical in establishing a 
firm management foundation. Without management 
continuity, program stability can be seriously 
undermined. 
Well-written, understandable maintenance and 
operation manuals published by the contractor will 
prove invaluable during DT/OT. Responsibility for 
written technical manuals must be delineated early- 
on in the program. 
Continuous interface between the program office and 
the end-user community is critical throughout the 
entire acquisition process. User participation 
begins with requirements generation and 
continuously evolves through logistical support. 
A sufficient number of DT/OT prototype vehicles 
must be manufactured to allow for timely diagnosis 
and correction of deficiencies at both the test 
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site(s) and the production facility. Limiting or 
cutting the number of available prototypes may save 
a few dollars in the short run, but invariably has 
a much higher cost (in terms of maintaining a tight 
schedule) in the long run. 
D.   SUMMARY 
This chapter has analyzed and highlighted several key 
reasons why the Ml Abrams tank program has enjoyed overwelming 
success. Development of an acquisition strategy that 
addresses the fundamental issues of realism, stability, 
flexibility, and controlled risk is no easy task. The PM, in 
continuous interaction with the user community, is responsible 
for the development and execution of the acquisition strategy. 
This program was successful because it: maintained 
program advocacy, developed a realistic and achievable 
schedule, allowed the contractor the freedom to design within 
specific performance parameters and, perhaps most importantly, 
produced the most lethal, survivable, and technologically 
advanced main battle tank in the world. 
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VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
A. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
It is clear that the formulation of a sound program 
acquisition strategy is a difficult and arduous task. The 
Program Manager (PM) plays an intricate and vital role in 
formulating the direction and path the program will follow 
throughout its life-cycle. In an effort to provide 
acquisition managers and the Department of Defense (DoD) with 
successful lessons-learned, this thesis has examined one of 
the premier programs of the 1970s and early 1980s: the Ml 
Abrams tank. 
At a time when Defense dollars and resources are waning, 
both successful and unsuccessful programs must be closely 
examined. This analysis of the Ml Abrams acquisition strategy- 
has provided numerous examples of a well-managed and well- 
supported program environment. This program began with a 
clearly defined Mission Need Statement. It received and 
maintained critical DoD and Congressional support and had an 
exceptional cast of program leadership. The contractor was 
given the freedom to design and develop a weapon system within 
minimum stated parameters that met or exceeded all user 
requirements and performance objectives. A well-developed 
schedule allocating the time necessary to develop immature 
technology was implemented and followed with little deviation. 
Pre-Planned Product Improvements (P3I) were well-thought out 
and adeptly incorporated into follow-on models. In summary, 
this program epitomizes the way an acquisition strategy should 
be formulated and executed. 
B. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
• What were the principal successes and failures 
experienced with the acquisition strategy of the Ml 
Abrams Tank System and can they be duplicated or 
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avoided in future major weapon systems acquisitions? 
The acquisition strategy for this program was unique from 
its inception. The procurement philosophy for the Ml program 
was based on a seven-year development concept. The most 
significant benefit of the seven-year development program over 
the six-year period, was a drastic reduction in the degree of 
technical risk associated with achieving the required levels 
of armor protection within the weight limits imposed. 
The Ml Abrams tank program utilized competition during 
its Demonstration and Validation (DEM/VAL) Phase although 
qualified competitors in this exclusive market were, 
obviously, limited. In addition to the aforementioned 
competitive strategy, "break-out" was also included as an 
option during full-scale production. Sole-source procurement 
proved to be the most beneficial to the Government in terms of 
cost and readiness and was utilized during Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development (EMD), Low-Rate Initial Production 
(LRIP), and full-scale production. 
Concurrency of developmental and operational testing 
(DT/OT) was utilized during EMD in order to meet an aggressive 
development schedule. DT and OT were conducted 
simultaneously and both encountered numerous problems. The 
quantity of prototype vehicles available for DT/OT was 
insufficient and inadequate for correcting deficiencies found 
at both test sites and the production facility. However, both 
the program office and the contractor were able to surmount 
the many obstacles encountered through great teamwork and 
unity of effort. 
A Design-to-Cost (DTC) goal was set at $507,790 per tank 
(FY 1972 dollars) and this estimate was established as the 
average unit 'roll-away' cost. This cost control mechanism is 
designed to track contractor costs throughout the design, 
development, and production of a system in order to identify 
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and highlight any major changes to original estimates. The 
program was successful in coming in just a little above that 
price. 
A Pre-Planned Product Improvement (P3I) strategy was 
incorporated which afforded the PM a means of incorporating 
not yet perfected technology without having to develop an 
entirely new system. This proved to be a very successful 
concept and it minimized late design changes that could have 
seriously undermined the stability of the program. 
Incentivizing a contractor to perform in a realistic, 
cost-effective and responsible manner was accomplished through 
the development and implementation of various contractual 
strategies. Competitively negotiated, Cost-Pius-Incentive-Fee 
(CPIF) contracts for DEM/VAL were awarded allowing both 
contractors the largest possible amount of design freedom. 
The contract had performance-based requirements and the 
incentive was on cost of contract performance only. Winning 
the DEM/VAL phase, Chrysler Defense was awarded a Fixed-Price- 
Incentive-Firm (FPIF) contract for EMD which also included the 
first two years of production. Annual contracts for 
production between 1981 and 1983 were Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP). 
Overall, this program's acquisition strategy was well 
planned and executed and provides an excellent example of an 
effective, functional acquisition environment. There is no 
reason that these strategic concepts cannot be successfully 
incorporated into future programs remembering that each 
program should be tailored and continuously refined as it 
progresses. 
• What is a Mission Need Statement and what is involved 
in its development? 
The Mission Need Statement (MNS) defines a Service's 
perceived mission need in broad operational terms, identifies 
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the validated threat to be countered as well as the projected 
threat environment in which it needs to operate, and outlines 
the initial acquisition strategy the proposed system will 
follow. 
Mission Area Analysis is conducted to identify any 
deficiencies in existing defense capabilities. If a serious 
deficiency exists and it can not be countered by a change in 
doctrine, tactics, or other non-material solutions, it is 
documented in a MNS, validated, and once approved, enters into 
the Concept Exploration/ Definition Phase for further research 
and study. 
• What was the Mission Need Statement for the Ml Abrams 
Tank System? 
Succinctly stated, the Mission Need Statement for the Ml 
Abrams tank was to field a tank system specifically designed 
as an assault vehicle to replace an aging fleet and to meet 
the projected threat of the 1980's and beyond. In addition, 
this tank system would provide increased performance over 
other tanks currently in the Army inventory in the areas of 
reliability, availability, maintainability, survivability, 
tactical mobility, night fighting capability, and hit 
probability. 
• What is an Acquisition Strategy and how does it relate 
to the overall acquisition process? 
An acquisition strategy can be thought of as the primary 
road map or blueprint on how the PM expects to evolve from the 
basic mission need to system production and equipment 
fielding. It is a 'living' document which is updated and 
revised from its inception during Phase 0 throughout the 
entire acquisition process. 
It covers the entire life-cycle of the proposed system 
and is one of the tools utilized to reduce and mitigate risks 
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in the program.   This strategy lays the foundation for 
management   concepts,   control   measures,   contracting 
alternatives, competition, test and evaluation requirements, 
logistics  support,  personnel  and  training  requirements, 
funding issues, and a host of other important factors in the 
acquisition program. 
• What DoD directives and policies govern the formulation 
of an Acquisition Strategy? 
There are a number of program planning documents which 
require the development of an acquisition strategy. Because 
of its importance, the strategy will be tailored to meet the 
specific needs of the program as directed by DoD Directive 
5000.2 The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and other 
directives issued by DoD and each individual Service also 
govern strategy formulation. 
• What was the overall Acquisition Strategy for the Ml? 
The Ml acquisition strategy utilized a seven-year 
development concept in conjunction with a DTC threshold. CPIF 
contracts were awarded during the Fly-Before-Buy competitive 
prototype validation. Performance-based specifications were 
utilized during the competition and a sole-source contractor 
was selected for EMD. This contractor was awarded a FPIF 
contract that included the first two years of production only. 
LRIP and concurrent DT/OT were utilized during EMD. Although 
competition was planned for full-scale production, a sole- 
source justification based on cost and schedule constraints 
was utilized. P3I was also incorporated into the acquisition 
strategy along with component break-out during follow-on 
production. 
• What is an Acquisition Plan?   What are the basic 
requirements involved in its development and approval? 
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Acquisition planning is ehe process by which the efforts 
of all personnel responsible for an acquisition are 
coordinated and integrated through a comprehensive plan for 
fulfilling the agency need in a timely manner and at a 
reasonable cost. 
The acquisition plan has statutory and regulatory 
requirements outlined in the FAR, Part 7 . This plan documents 
the decisions made during the development of the acquisition 
strategy to include: the program's major objectives, policies, 
and all the definitive actions that must be accomplished 
during the various phases of the acquisition cycle. It 
integrates all of the technical, business, management, legal, 
and other significant actions which must be accomplished 
throughout the life-cycle of the program. It is approved by 
the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA). 
• What was the overall Acquisition Plan (including 
Milestones) for this program and to what extent did 
execution of the program meet the plan? 
The procurement philosophy for the tank was a seven-year 
development program accomplished in three separate, distinct 
phases. Phase I of the plan was Competitive Prototype 
Validation, currently known as DEM/VAL. This phase combined 
both the Concept Exploration and Definition phase and the 
Demonstration and Validation phase of today into one succinct 
phase of operation. 
Phase II of the plan was Engineering Development and 
Producibility Engineering and Planning (ED/PEP), known today 
as EMD. Phase III was LRIP with follow-on full-scale 
production. 
The program followed its initial acquisition plan and was 
extremely successful. The newly-designed and developed Ml 
tank  met  or  exceeded  all  the  design  and  performance 
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specifications required by the Army, 
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APPENDIX A: ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS 
The following acronyms and definitions are synopsized 
from the Defense Systems Management College manual, Glossary: 
Defense Acquisition Acronyms & Terms. 
ACAT - Acquisition Category-   Categories established to 
facilitate decentralized decision-making and execution and 
compliance with  statutorily  imposed  requirements.    The 
categories determine the level of review, decision authority, 
and applicable procedures. 
Acquisition Plan - A formal written document reflecting the 
specific actions necessary to execute the approach established 
in the approved acquisition strategy and guiding contractual 
implementation. 
Acquisition Strategy - A business and technical management 
approach designed to achieve program objectives within 
resource constraints imposed. It is the framework for 
planning, directing, and managing a program. It provides a 
master schedule for research, development, test, production, 
fielding, and other activities essential for program success, 
and for formulating functional plans, and strategies to 
include: Test and Evaluation Master Plan, Acquisition Plan, 
competion, prototyping, etc. 
ADM - Acquisition Decision Memorandum. A memorandum signed 
by the milestone decision authority that documents decisions 
made and the exit criteria established as the result of a 
milestone decision review or in-process review. 
APB - Acquisition Program Baseline. Acquisition program 
baselines  embody  the  cost,  schedule,  and  performance 
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objectives of the program. It is approved by the milestone 
decision authority at milestone reviews. 
ASARC - Army Systems Acquisition Review Council. The Army- 
level equivalent to the Defense Acquisition Board. Chaired by 
the Army Acquisition Executive, it provides recommendations 
and input prior to each Milestone review. 
Break-Out. Execution of acquisition strategy to convert some 
parts or system components from contractor-furnished to 
government-furnished. Rather than having prime contractor 
provide from its sources, government goes out to industry 
directly and procures items. 
CAE - Component Acquisition Executive. A single official 
within a Department of Defense Component who is responsible 
for all Acquisition functions within that component. This 
includes Service Acquisition Executives for the Military 
Departments and Acquisition Executives in other DoD Components 
who have acquisition management responsibilities. 
CE/D - Concept Exploration and Definition. Beginning at 
Mission Need Determination, the initial phase of the system 
acquisition process. During this phase, the acquisition 
strategy is developed, system alternatives are proposed and 
examined, and the systems program requirements document is 
expanded to support subsequent phases. 
CICA - Competition in Contracting Act. Passed in 1984, this 
Act contains numerous provisions dealing with the enhancement 
of competition and the restriction of noncompetitive 
procurement procedures. 
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COEA - Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis.   An 
analysis of the costs and operational effectiveness of 
alternative material systems to meet a mission need and the 
associated program for acquiring each alternative. 
Concurrency. Part of an acquisition strategy which combines 
or overlaps phases of the acquisition process, or development 
T&E and operational T&E. 
Contractor. An entity in private industry which enters into 
contracts with the government to provide goods or services. 
DAB - Defense Acquisition Board. The senior Department of 
Defense acquisition review board chaired by the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology 
(USD(AScT) ) . The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is 
the Vice-Chair. Other members include the Deputy USD(A&T); 
Acquisition Executives of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the 
Director of Defense Research and Engineering; the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation; and 
the Comptroller of the Department of Defense. 
DAE - Defense Acquisition Executive. The principal advisor 
and assistant to the Secretary of Defense and the focal point 
in OSD for the systems acquisition process. The USD(A&T) is 
the DAE. 
DATP - Detroit Arsenal Tank Plant. 
DEM/VAL - Demonstration and Validation. Normally the second 
phase in the acquisition process,  following Milestone I. 
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Consists of steps necessary to resolve or minimize logistics 
problems identified during concept exploration, verify 
preliminary design and engineering, build prototypes, 
accomplish necessary planning and fully analyze trade-off 
proposals. The objective is to validate the choice of 
alternatives and to provide the basis for determining whether 
to proceed into Engineering & Manufacturing Development. 
DoD - Department of Defense. 
DSARC - Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council, (obsolete) 
Currently replaced by the Defense Acquisition Board. 
DT - Developmental Test and Evaluation. Test and evaluation 
conducted to measure progress, usually of component/sub- 
systems, and to assist the engineer design and development 
process and verify attainment of technical performance 
specifications and objectives. Usually conducted under 
controlled or laboratory conditions. 
DTUC - Design-to-ünit-Cost. Management concept wherein 
rigorous cost goals are established during development and the 
control of systems costs (acquisition, operating, and support) 
to these goals is achieved by practical tradeoffs between 
operational capability, performance, costs, and schedule. 
Cost, as a key design parameter, is addressed on a continuing 
basis and as an inherent part of the development and 
production process. 
ED/PEP - Engineering Development and Producibility Engineering 
and Planning, (obsolete) Currently known as Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development (EMD). 
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EMD - Engineering and Manufacturing Development. The third 
phase in the acquisition process, following Milestone II. The 
system/equipment and the principal items necessary for its 
support are fully developed, engineered, designed, fabricated, 
tested, and evaluated. The intended output is, as a minimum, 
a pre-production system which closely approximates the final 
product, the documentation necessary to enter the production 
phase, and the test results which demonstrate that the 
production product will meet stated requirements. 
FAR - Federal Acquisition Regulation. A published Federal 
Government regulation guide which details all requirements for 
acquisition and procurement inside all Federal Government 
agencies. 
FMS - Foreign Miliary Sales.  That portion of U.S. security 
assistance authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 
as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act, as amended.  The 
recipient provides reimbursement for defense articles and 
services transferred from the U.S. 
FOC - Full Operational Capability. The full attainment of the 
capability to employ effectively a weapon, item of equipment, 
or system of approved specific characteristics, which is 
manned and operated by a trained, equipped, and supported 
military unit or force. 
FOT&E - Follow-On Operational Test and Evaluation. That test 
and evaluation that is necessary during and after the 
production period to refine the estimates made during 
operational test and evaluation, to evaluate changes, and to 
reevaluate the system to ensure that it continues to meet 
79 
operational needs and retains its effectiveness in a new 
environment or against a new threat. 
FY - Fiscal Year. U.S. Government calendar year from 1 
October to 3 0 September (12 months). 
FYDP - Future Years Defense Program. The official DoD 
document which summarizes forces and resources associated with 
programs approved by the Secretary of Defense. Its three 
parts are the organizations affected, appropriations accounts 
(RDT&E, operations & maintenence, etc.) and the 11 major force 
programs (strategic forces, airlift/sealift, R&D, etc.) Under 
the biennial PPBS cycle, FYDP is updated in even years in 
April  (POM);  October  (budget);  and  then  in  January 
(President's budget) of odd years. 
GDLS - General Dynamics Land Systems. 
GFE - Government Furnished Equipment. Property in the 
possession of or acquired directly by the Government, and 
subsequently delivered to or otherwise made available to the 
contractor. 
GFM - Government Furnished Material. Material is Government 
property which may be incorporated into or attached to an end 
item to be delivered under a contract or which may be consumed 
in the performance of a contract. It includes, but is not 
limited to, raw and processed material, parts, components, 
assemblies, and small tools and supplies. 
GOCO - Government-Owned-Contractor-Operated. A manufacturing 
plant that is owned by the Government and operated by a 
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contractual civilian organization. 
Gold Plating.  A term used to denote excessive or additional 
materials, components, or gadgetry that have an associated 
cost burden to the Government but provide no added benefit 
or intrinsic value to a given system. 
IOC - Initial Operational Capability. The first attainment of 
the minimum capability to effectively employ a weapon, item of 
equipment, or system of approved specific characteristics, and 
which is manned and operated by an adequately trained, 
equipped, and supported military unit or force. 
IOT&E -  Initial Operational Test and Evaluation.   All 
operational test and evaluation conducted on production or 
production representative articles, to support the decision to 
proceed beyond low-rate-initial-production. It is conducted 
to provide a valid estimate of expected system operational 
effectiveness and operational suitability. 
JROC - Joint Requirements Oversight Council. A council, 
chaired by the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, that: 
conducts requirements analyses; determines the validity of 
mission needs and develops recommended joint priorities for 
those needs it approves; and validates performance objectives 
and thresholds in support of the Defense Acquisition Board. 
Council members include the Vice Chiefs of the Army, Navy, and 
Air Force, and the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. 
LATP - Lima Army Tank Plant. 
LCC- Life Cycle Cost.  The total cost to the Government of 
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acquisition and ownership of a system over its useful life. 
It includes the cost of development, acquisition, support, 
and, where applicable, disposal. 
LRIP - Low-Rate-Initial-Production. The production of a 
system in limited quantity to provide articles for operational 
test and evaluation, to establish an initial production base, 
and to permit an orderly increase in the production rate 
sufficient to lead to full-rate production upon successful 
completion of operational testing. 
MAA - Mission Area Analysis. The process by which warfighting 
deficiencies are determined, technological opportunities for 
increased system effectiveness and/or cost reduction are 
assessed, and mission needs identified. 
MBT - Main Battle Tank. 
MDA - Milestone Decision Authority. The individual designated 
to make decisions resulting from milestone reviews of defense 
acquisition programs. Acquisition category (ACAT) levels 
determine the level of milestone decision authority. The MDA 
for ACAT ID programs is the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition and Technology (USD(A&T)). 
MNS - Mission Need Statement. A non-system specific statement 
of operational capability need, developed by DoD Components 
and forwarded to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council 
(JROC) for validation and approval (major efforts), or to the 
JROC for information (non-major efforts) . The MNS goes to the 
milestone decision authority for a determination on whether or 
not to convene a Milestone 0 review. 
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MOU - Memorandum of understanding. Official agreements 
concluded between the defense ministries of NATO nations and 
ranking below government-level international treaties. 
Defacto, such agreements are generally recognized by all 
partners as binding even if no legal claim could be based on 
the rights and obligations laid down in them. 
NBC - Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical. 
OMB - Office of Management and Budget. Federal Government 
agency which establishes executive policy. OMB Circular A-109 
establishes executive policy for the acquisition of major 
systems and applies to all executive branch agencies. 
ORD - Operational Requirements Document. Previously known as 
the Required Operational Capability (ROC). Documents the 
user's objectives and minimum acceptable requirements for 
operational performance of a proposed concept or system. 
O&S Cost - Operating and Support Cost. Those resources 
required to operate and support a system, subsystem, or a 
major component during its useful life in the operational 
inventory. 
OT - Operational Test and Evaluation. A field test, under 
realistic conditions, of any item (or key component) of 
weapons, equipment, or munitions for the purpose of 
determining the effectiveness and suitability of the weapons, 
equipment, or munitions for use in combat by typical military 
users; and the evaluation of the results of such tests. 
PM - Program Manager.  Official responsible for managing a 
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specific acquisition program who reports to and receives 
direction from either a Program Executive Officer or a 
Component Acquisition Executive. 
PPBS - Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System.    The 
primary resource allocation process of DoD „ One of three 
major decision-making support systems for defense acquisition. 
It is a formal, systematic structure for making decisions on 
policy, strategy, and the development of forces and 
capabilities to accomplish anticipated missions. PPBS is a 
cyclic process containing three distinct, but interrelated 
phases: planning, which produces Defense Planning Guidance 
(DPG); programming, which produces an approved Program 
Objectives Memorandum (POM) for the Military Departments and 
Defense Agencies; and budgeting, which produces the DoD 
portion of the President's national budget. 
P3I - Pre-Planned Product Improvement. Planned future 
evolutionary improvement of developmental systems for which 
designed considerations are effected during development to 
enhance future application of projected technology. Includes 
improvements planned for ongoing systems that go beyond the 
current performance envelope to achieve a needed operational 
capability. 
RAM-D - Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, and 
Durability. Requirement imposed on acquisition systems to 
ensure they are operationally ready for use when needed, will 
successfully perform assigned functions, and can be 
economically operated and maintained within the scope of 
logistics concepts and policies. 
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R&D - Research and Development. Activities for the 
development of a new system that include basic and exploratory 
research, and advanced and engineering development. 
RDT&E  -  Research,  Development,  Test  and  Evaluation. 
Activities for the development of a new system that include 
basic and exploratory research, advanced and engineering 
development, development and operational testing and the 
evaluation of test results. 
RFP - Request For Proposals. A solicitation used in a 
negotiated acquisition to communicate Government requirements 
to prospective contractor(s) and to solicit proposals. 
ROC - Required Operational Capability, (obsolete) Currently 
known as the Operational Requirements Document (ORD). Details 
the performance and related operational parameters for a 
concept or system proposed for meeting the Mission Need 
Statement (MNS). 
SECDEF - Secretary of Defense. 
SSA - Source Selection Authority. The official designated to 
direct the source selection process, approve the source 
selection plan, select the source(s), and announce contract 
award. 
TDP - Technical Data Package.  A technical description of an 
item  adequate  for  supporting  an  acquisition  strategy, 
production,  engineering,  and  logistics  support.    The 
description defines the required design configuration and 
procedures to ensure adequacy of item performance.   It 
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consists of all applicable technical data such as drawings, 
associated lists, specifications, standards, performance 
requirements, quality assurance provisions, and packaging 
details . 
USD(AÄT) - Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and 
Technology. The USD(A&T) has policy and procedural authority 
for the defense acquisition system and is the principal 
acquisition official of the Department and is the acquisition 
advisor to the Secretary of Defense. In this capacity the 
USD(A&T) serves as the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE), 
the Defense Procurement Executive, and the National Armaments 
Director; the last regarding matters of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO). His authority ranges from 
directing the Services and Defense Agencies on acquisition 
matters, to establishing the Defense Supplement to the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR), and chairing the Defense 
Acquisition Board (DAB) for major defense acquisition program 
reviews. 
User - That command, unit, or element which will be the 
recipient of the production item for use in accomplishing a 
designated mission. This term is also used to define the 
operator and maintainer of the system. 
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APPENDIX  B: Ml  ABRAMS   TANK  SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS 
(UNCLASSIFIED) 
PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Weight, combat loaded 58.9 tons 
Ground Clearance 19 in 
Height, turret roof 93.5 in 
Length, main gun forward 3 84 .5 in 
Length, main gun rearward 353 .2 in 
Width 143 . 8 in 
PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS 
Acceleration, 0 to 20 mph 6.1 sec 
Maximum forward speed, governed 45 mph 
Average cross country speed 30 mph 
Range, constant speed 25 mph 275 miles 
Fording depth 
without kit 48 in 
with kit Turret roof 
Obstacle Crossing 
Vertical wall 49 in 
Trench 9 ft 
Braking 
30 mph speed, dry/level....14 ft/sec2 
Ground pressure 13 .3 psi 
SUSPENSION 
Type Hydromechanical 
Road wheels 7 per side 
Torsion bars. 7 per side 
Shock absorbers, modular rotary.3 per side 




6 batteries, 12 volts 24 v.d.c. 
Electrical capacity 
battery only 300 amp hours 
Alternator, charging system 650 amp 
Voltage regulator solid state 
FIRE CONTROL 
Rangefinder, laser 200-8,000 meters 
Night vision Thermal Imager 
Gunner' s sight 1,3, &10X 
Commander' s MG sight 3X 
ARMAMENT 
Main Gun 105mm 
Coaxial machinegun(MG)..7.62mm 
Commander' s MG 50 cal 
Loader' s MG 7 . 62mm 
Smoke grenade launcher....40mm 
Rifle 5.56mm 
AMMUNITION STOWAGE 
Main Gun 55 rds 
Coaxial MG 10,000 rds 
Commander's MG 1,000 rds 
Loader's MG 1,400 rds 
Smoke grenades 24 rds 
Rifle 210 rds 
TRANSMISSION 
Type Automatic/Mechanical 




Braking Hydraulic and 
mechanical 
ENGINE 
Type 1500 HP Multifuel 
Turbine, Air Cooled 
Gross HP..1,500 HP ® 3,000 rpm 
Gross torque 
2,620 lb/ft @ 3,000 rpm 
Max torque 
3,952 lb/ft @ 1,500 rpm 
Fuel capacity 508 gals 
Oil capacity 
including oil cooler and 
line capacity 7 gals 
OTHER EQUIPMENT 
Driver passive night vision 
device 
Halon Electro-optical Fire 
Suppression System 
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FIRE CONTROL OTHER EQUIPMENT 
Auxiliary Telescope 8X 
Gun/Turret drive,........Electro-hydraulic 
Gunner or Commander can 
fire main weapon system 
Ballistic computer..Digital, self checking 
Crew heater 




[Ref. 20:pp. 33-34] 
88 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
1. Executive Office of the President, Office of Management 
and Budget, Report to the Congress 1976 Office of Federal 
Procurement Policy, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 1977. 
2. Cochrane, C.B., "Defense Acquisition Policy: A New Set of 
Directives for a Disciplined Management Approach", Program 
Manager, Journal of the Defense Systems Management College, 
May-June 19 91. 
3 . Program Managers Notebook, The Defense Systems Management 
College, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, June 1992. 
4. Office of Management and Budget Circular A-10 9, Major 
System Acquisition, 5 April 1976. 
5. Department of Defense Directive 5000.2, Defense 
Acquisition Management Policies and Procedures, 23 February 
1991. 
6. Contracting for Major Systems Readings Book, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, June 1993. 
7. Acquisition Strategy Guide, The Defense Systems 
Management College, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, First Edition, 
July 1984. 
8. Department of Defense Directive 5000.1 (Part 2), Defense 
Acquisition Management Policies and Procedures, 23 February 
1991. 
9. Berzins, A.T. and Cohen, B.L., Acquisition Strategy: 
Concept and Definition, M.S. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, California, March 1977. 
10. Federal Acquisition Regulation, Department of Defense, 
Commerce Clearing House, Inc., Chicago, Illinois, 1993. 
11. Nash, Ralph C. and Cibinic, John, Competitive 
Negotiation: The Source Selection Process, George Washington 
University, Washington D.C, 1993. 
12. Kelly, Orr, King of the Killing Zone, W.W. Norton & 
Company, New York, 1989. 
13. Polk, James H., "We Need a New Tank", Army Magazine, 
Association of the United States Army, Washington, D.C, June 
1972. 
89 
14. Lessons Learned: Ml Abrams Tank System, Defense Systems 
Management College, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, July 1983. 
15. Wilner, Larry E., XM-1 The Birth of a Main Battle Tank: 
The First Two Years, A Case Study, Industrial College of the 
Armed Forces, Washington, D.C., April 1975. 
16. Advanced Procurement Plan for the XM-1 Tank System, 1st 
Indorsement, Department of the Army, Project Manager Tank 
Systems, Warren, Michigan, 28 March 1975. 
17. Ml Tank System Acquisition Plan Update #2, Department of 
the Army, Project Manager Tank Systems, Warren, Michigan, 23 
March 1984. 
18. Abrams Tank Operating Costs, General Accounting Office, 
National Security and International Affairs Division, Report 
91-114, Washington, D.C., February 1991. 
19. Abrams Tank System Acquisition Plan Update #3, Department 
of the Army, Program Executive Office, Heavy Force 
Modernization, United States Army Tank-Automotive Command, 
Warren, Michigan, 22 June 1989. 
20. Taylor, R.R.,LTC (Ret), "XM-1 Update II", Armor Magazine, 
Association of the United States Army, Washington, D.C., May- 
June 1978. 
21. Hernandez, Juan J., A Comparative Analysis of Options for 
Preserving the Tank Industrial Base, M.S. Thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, March 1993. 
22 . Advanced Procurement Plan for the XM815 Tank System, 
Department of the Army, Project Manager, XM815 Tank System, 
AMC, Warren, Michigan, 15 September 1972. 
23
• Glossary: Defense Acquisition Acronyms & Terms, Defense 
Systems Management College, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, Fifth 
Edition, September, 1991. 
24.  Cleland,  Gallagher,  Whitehead,    Military Project 
Management Handbook, McGraw Hill, Inc., New York, 1993. 
90 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
Defense Technical Information Center 2 
Cameron Station 
Alexandria, Virginia 22304-6145 
Library, Code 52 2 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943-5101 
Professor David V. Lamm, Code SM/Lt 5 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943-5002 
Professor David F. Matthews, Code SM/Md 1 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943-5002 
Professor Mark Stone, Code SM/St 2 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943-5002 
OASA (RDA) 1 
ATTN: SARD-ZAC 
103 Army Pentagon 
Washington D.C. 20310-0103 
Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange 1 
U.S. Army Logistics Management College 
Fort Lee, Virginia 23801-6043 
CPT Kevin C. Millspaugh 2 
P.O. Box 319 
Lockport, New York 140 95 
91 
